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Introduction 
Introduction 
Executive summary 
This report on medicine pricing was commissioned by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for 
International Development (DFID) and aims to analyse the existing and potential 
impact of a variety of equitable pricing mechanisms.  The study was carried out 
in support of the wider process of developing feasible policy options to increase 
access to essential medicines. 
 
The terms ‘differential pricing’, or ‘equitable pricing’ can be defined as pricing 
based on ability to pay.  As it relates to the policy goal of maximizing health 
impact through affordability of medicines, a more accurate term might be ‘equity 
pricing’, where countries apply a price structure or pricing policy according to 
some principle of fairness or equity.  In practice this may mean proportionality 
with income per capita, human development index or similar indicators.  
 
The report focuses on the voluntary mechanisms - bulk purchasing and 
competitive tendering; voluntary tiered pricing agreements; and voluntary 
licensing - and on how to more effectively capture advantages from these 
mechanisms.  Evidence for the potential impact of other mechanisms, including 
compulsory licensing; delay in patent protection, as allowed by the Doha 
Declaration; systematic, government-imposed patent waivers; and price controls 
has also been analysed. 
 
Equitable pricing is economically feasible due to the fact that variable costs 
comprise only approximately 15% of the total costs of producing a 
pharmaceutical product.  It is also potentially feasible due to the fact that poor 
countries contribute so little to overall sales of the pharmaceutical industry; 
therefore, equitable pricing need not financially damage pharmaceutical 
companies.  On the contrary, equitable pricing should theoretically be desirable 
to global companies since they would maximize their profits on products that are 
sold in both low- and high-income markets.1   
 
However, market segmentation is a crucial pre-condition to the willingness of 
firms to engage in voluntary equitable pricing.  Price and product leakage must 
be tackled jointly, by addressing the primary determinants of leakage: the 
incentives to leak products and engage in reference pricing and the feasibility of 
this leakage.  Effective segmentation requires the co-operation of all stakeholders, 
including developed and developing country governments and the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
                                                     
1 The theoretical case for this is more complex than indicated, being dependent on the degree to which markets 
are segmented and on relative demand elasticities.  See Scherer and Watal (2001), pp.45‐49 for a more detailed 
discussion. 
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Two trends account for the need for equitable pricing mechanisms to reach 
further in order to meet public health needs.  On the one hand, the burden of 
disease in poor countries is large and growing.  On the other hand, finance to 
meet this demand is limited.  This gap between need and resources is occurring 
in the context of a changing intellectual property environment and the switch 
from chemistry-based to biology-based research and development (R&D).  These 
changes are likely to decrease the levels of competition for new, patented 
products, and thus inhibit the degree of price reductions seen in recent years, 
attributable to generic copies of patented drugs.   
 
This report does not present new empirical data or new economic concepts and 
tools, although it does use existing data and economic tools in new ways.  It does 
not make policy recommendations concerning preferred mechanisms, realising 
that different readers and institutions will have differing objectives, perspectives 
and time-frames over which to influence policy, and will be operating in 
different contexts.  However, the study attempts to take a systematic approach to 
examining objective evidence on the impact and potential of each mechanism. 
The reader is left to apply the analysis to his/her own situation.   
 
Bulk purchasing and competitive tendering are effective in reducing prices in 
many different environments, and in combination with many other equitable 
pricing mechanisms.  This study concludes that their potential to achieve more 
affordable prices has not yet been fully realized.  Many governments need to 
improve their procurement practices at country level and regional level, and 
demand pooling could take on larger proportions, especially with the advent of 
new major funding mechanisms such as the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria. 
 
Voluntary tiered pricing agreements have thus far been limited in terms of 
disease scope and impact on access.  Improvements, in terms of increasing the 
bargaining power of the purchasers, could be made to the structure of these 
agreements.  However, there are numerous other concerns with these 
agreements, such as lack of transparency, anti-competitive tendency, and high 
transaction costs relative to benefits gained. 
 
There are multiple interventions that can be taken to facilitate the effectiveness  
of bulk purchasing and voluntary tiered pricing agreements in terms of 
protecting the interests of all parties and creating a sustainable, adaptable 
situation.  International organizations have a strong role to play in helping make 
these relationships more effective. 
 
Although companies sometimes license their patents voluntarily for strategic 
reasons, the more common model in producing countries is for companies to 
work through their local affiliates.  There are now a few examples of voluntary 
licenses that have been issued for equitable pricing purposes and these should be 
monitored for impact.  Demand for licenses might increase, as producing 
countries implement trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS).  
Theoretically, willingness of firms to supply the licenses should increase as well, 
if Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration, requiring governments to construct 
incentives for technology transfer, is implemented.   
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Compulsory licensing is potentially an important instrument, allowable by 
TRIPS, to ensure that medicines are available to meet public health needs.  No 
developing country has yet invoked a compulsory license; however, they have 
proven to be an effective bargaining tool for several developing countries in 
negotiating reduced prices with patent holders.  Compulsory licensing has 
therefore been used to increase the leverage of other equitable pricing 
mechanisms.  Although, as part of negotiations on Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, there have been 
attempts to resolve the legal barriers to the use of compulsory licensing in non-
producing countries, resolution of the practical, economic and technological 
barriers must also be sought. 
 
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted by 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in November 2001, 
resulted in an agreement that the least developed countries would not be 
required to implement patent protection on pharmaceuticals until 2016.  If it were 
possible for the least developed countries (LDCs) to take full advantage of this 
delay in patent protection, this would be a very effective mechanism, in the short 
term, to achieve equitable pricing.  However, since most developing countries 
already observe patents, and since a reliable supply of low-priced copies of 
newly patented medicines is unlikely to continue post-2006, this extension has 
little meaning to LDCs.   
 
Another mechanism proposed for equitable pricing is the use of patent waivers.  
Although pharmaceutical companies might choose to waive their patent rights in 
certain LDCs in an unsystematic manner2, the type of patent waiver that is 
reviewed in this report is a systematic, internationally agreed, and government-
led system.  This system would require the patent holder to sign a declaration, 
when filing for patents in developed countries, that a lawsuit for patent 
infringement would not be brought against the least developed countries when a 
generic firm markets a copy of a patented product for a disease prevalent in both 
developing and developed countries, i.e. ‘global’ diseases.  Patent waivers would 
not apply to drugs to treat diseases only present in developing countries, thus 
patent protection would continue to strengthen, according to TRIPS, for drugs 
that treat these ‘local’ diseases.  This mechanism would provide a transparent, 
predictable, global framework for pharmaceutical patents that is economically 
logical, in that it finds the optimal balance between prices and R&D incentives for 
countries at different stages of economic development.  Unfortunately, this 
mechanism  is unlikely be feasible politically, thus negating all its theoretical 
advantages. 
 
Price controls levied by governments have been effective in reducing prices.  If 
applied to private sector retail pharmacies, price controls, more than any other 
mechanism, have the potential to have an impact not just on the manufacturer’s 
price, but on the final price the consumer pays.  However, the use of price 
controls may result in withdrawal of the products from the market, thereby 
reducing access.  Access problems caused by market withdrawal could 
                                                     
2 In practice, unsystematic, company‐led patent waivers would be much less effective than the systematic type 
reviewed  here.    See  the  arguments presented under  ‘delaying/reversing patent protection’  and  ‘compulsory 
licensing’  regarding  the  market  certainty/volume  needed  for  generic  producing  firms  to  be  able  to  enter  a 
market. 
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theoretically be minimized by restricting the use of price controls to public sector 
purchasing, and/or using compulsory licensing as a back-up to this mechanism.   
The impact of price controls on R&D could be negative, but it would depend on 
the size of the market in question and on the products to which the price control 
mechanism is applied.   
 
In the final section of the report, each mechanism is analysed according to a 
range of factors, such as impact on price reduction, possible effect on R&D, 
product and disease scope, impact on the poor, predictability, transparency, and 
sustainability.  The mechanisms are examined individually as well as in relation 
to each other. 
Purpose of the study  
This study was commissioned by WHO and DFID to explore the potential impact 
of equitable pricing, in order to inform discussion and recommendations at the 
third meeting of the UK Government’s High-Level Working Group on Access to 
Medicines, as well as to support the wider process of developing feasible policy 
options to increase access to essential medicines. 
Methods 
The methods used included: 
 
• A review of literature from a range of sources including the WHO/WTO 
Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs held 
in 2001 in Hosbjør, Norway, the UK High-Level Working Group, WHO, 
the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, the pharmaceutical 
industry, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and others (see 
Appendix A). 
• Interviews conducted by the author with people from industry, WHO, 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), NGOs, bulk 
purchasing organizations, authors of papers from the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, the Brookings Institute, London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, as well as academics at other institutions 
(see Appendix B). 
• Analysis of the results of the literature review and interviews, building 
upon existing empirical data and examining experience against relevant 
economic frameworks. 
• Presentation of the findings to the group that had commissioned the 
work, to a larger peer group within WHO and to members of the UK 
High-Level Working Group. 
Equitable pricing definition  
The term ‘equitable pricing’ can be defined as pricing based on ability to pay.  As 
it relates to the policy goal of maximizing health impact through affordability of 
medicines, it might be more accurately termed ‘equity pricing’, where countries 
apply a price structure or pricing policy according to some principle of fairness 
or equity.  In practice this may mean proportionality with income per capita, 
human development index or similar indicators.   
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When the term ‘differential pricing’ is used to describe a strategy employed by 
private companies to price based on what the market will bear,3 and with the 
goal to maximize profits, it could more accurately be called ‘discriminatory 
pricing’.  Other terms frequently used to refer to various differential and 
equitable pricing practices include  ‘tiered’, ‘preferential’, and ‘market 
segmented’ pricing.   
 
Some of the mechanisms (such as bulk purchasing) analysed in this paper are 
policy and management tools that rely on market mechanisms to achieve 
reduced prices in a given country.4  Others (e.g. patent waivers, voluntary tiered 
pricing, compulsory licensing, delayed patent protection) are directly aimed at 
achieving equitable pricing.55  In practice, many of the mechanisms are unlikely 
to lead to equitable pricing, as defined above.  In fact, developed countries are 
more likely than developing countries to be successful with many of the 
equitable pricing mechanisms since they have greater bargaining power, 
negotiating ability or capacity to produce domestically with issuance of a 
compulsory license.  Therefore, discussion would be very limited if it was 
restricted to those mechanisms which are likely to achieve equitable prices, or 
prices that, after covering for the marginal cost of production, have some direct 
relationship to the level of income or development in each country. 
Consequently, this report covers a range of mechanisms which policy makers can 
employ with the objective to achieve equitable pricing. It also includes discussion 
of the variations, including forms of international mediation or operational 
approaches, which can be employed to make these mechanisms more likely to  
achieve equitable pricing objectives. 
Scope of the report 
The problem of access to medicines in developing countries is multifaceted; the 
availability of financial resources, health systems and infrastructure, rational 
selection and use of medicines, as well as affordability, are all important 
determinants.  This report focuses on mechanisms to alter the pricing of 
medicines, recognizing that pricing is only one of many factors limiting access. 
On the assumption that international consensus supports the principle of 
equitable pricing, the report focuses less on the economic and social arguments. 
 
Even within the scope of pricing of pharmaceuticals, the suppliers’ price is only 
one aspect of the final price the consumer pays; additional costs such as taxes, 
agents’ fees, distribution and retail mark-ups can raise the final price significantly 
above the manufacturers’ price.  Only some of the equitable pricing mechanisms 
evaluated in this report would have an impact on these other aspects comprising 
the final price.  
 
This report focuses on the voluntary mechanisms:  
• Bulk purchasing and competitive tendering  
                                                     
3 As a function of, for example, the value that customers place on the product, the degree of competition it faces, 
and the purchaserʹs negotiating power. 
4Bulk purchasing. 
5 Patent waivers, voluntary tiered pricing, compulsory licensing, delaying patent protection. 
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• Voluntary tiered pricing agreements  
• Voluntary licensing  
and on how to more effectively capture advantages from these mechanisms.   
Evidence for the potential impact of other mechanisms is also analysed, 
including:  
• Compulsory licensing 
• Delay in patent protection, as allowed by the Doha Declaration 
• Systematic, government-imposed patent waivers 
• Price controls. 
The report does not present new empirical data or new economic concepts and 
tools, although it does use existing data and economic tools in new ways.  For 
example, existing empirical data are further analysed to determine the potential 
impact of more extensive equitable pricing in a case study of Uganda.  Similarly, 
existing economic frameworks are used to demonstrate how governance 
structures and contractual arrangements used with some mechanisms can help to 
make them more effective.   
 
Since different readers and institutions will have differing objectives, 
perspectives and time-frames over which to influence policy, and will be 
operating in different contexts, the report does not make policy 
recommendations concerning preferred mechanisms, but attempts to examine 
systematically objective evidence on the impact and potential of each mechanism. 
The reader is left to apply the analysis to his/her own situation.   
 
Recognizing that the factors giving rise to successful application of one approach 
may affect the likely success of other approaches, the mechanisms are also 
examined in relation to each other. 
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Key contextual issues 
Key contextual issues 
Motivation for and feasibility of equitable pricing 
Equitable pricing is economically feasible because the variable costs comprise 
only about 15% of the total costs of producing a pharmaceutical product.  Non-
variable costs, such as fixed production costs, research and development (R&D) 
expenditure, or marketing and administration costs, can be allocated arbitrarily.  
This gives pharmaceutical companies pricing flexibility in terms of where (i.e. in 
which markets) they choose to recover the fixed costs.   
 
Equitable pricing is also made possible due to the fact that less developed 
countries contribute so little to the overall profits of pharmaceutical firms.  
Africa, the Indian subcontinent and the developing countries of Asia account for 
only 1.2%, 1.3% and 2.6% respectively of the global pharmaceutical market (and 
the percentages are even smaller for the sales of patented medicines).6
 
In theory, equitable pricing should be not only feasible, but also desirable for 
pharmaceutical companies.  It is an economically rational way for global 
companies to maximize their profits on products that are sold in both low and 
high income markets.7  Since equitable pricing should also be a way to ensure 
that poorer people have access to less expensive products, the interests of health 
planners and pharmaceutical suppliers should theoretically be aligned.   
Equitable pricing in practice 
Although equitable pricing is economically feasible and theoretically desirable 
both for pharmaceutical suppliers and health planners/purchasers, actual prices 
appear to vary more or less randomly between countries, with some developing 
countries paying more than US prices and some less.  At best there is a very weak 
relationship between wholesale drug prices and per capita income.8  The actual 
price to the patient is further complicated by import duties, local tariffs, taxes and 
wholesaler profits.9   
 
These observations are confirmed by studies of multinational company pricing 
policies, mainly for anti-retrovirals (ARVs), which indicate that until recently 
                                                     
6 Friedman, den Besten, Attaran 2003. 
7 The theoretical case for this is more complex than indicated, being dependent the degree to which markets are 
segmented  and  on  relative demand  elasticities.    See  Scherer  and Watal  (2001), pp.45‐49  for  a more detailed 
discussion. 
8  Scherer,  F.  M.  &  Watal,  J.  (2001)  Post‐TRIPS  Options  for  Access  to  Patented  Medicines  in  Developing 
Countries, Commission on Macroeconomics and Health Background Paper, p.45.  
9 Scherer, F. M. & Watal, J. (2001), p.45. 
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there was remarkably little correlation10 between the price of a drug and a 
country’s per capita income.  In the last two years this situation may have 
changed slightly as some companies have lowered prices in response to 
international pressure, principally from NGOs, and potential competition from 
generic manufacturers, particularly from India.  For instance, between July 2000 
and April 2002 the annual cost of a branded triple ARV combination fell from 
over US$ 10 000 to just over US$ 700 per patient for selected groups of 
consumers.  Over the same time period, the lowest price for the generic 
combination had fallen to US$ 209 annually.11
Market segmentation and equitable pricing 
One of the main reasons why equitable pricing is not practised more is due to 
lack of separation between poor and wealthy markets.  In other words, patent 
holders fear that lower priced products will be diverted into wealthy markets.  
This is a real fear, since most companies rely heavily on sales from a limited 
number of successful drugs to finance continuing R&D.  Consequently, 
companies’ concerns are about patent protection and possible price erosion 
primarily as these affect the “blockbuster” drugs and wealthy markets.   
 
Thus, market separation is a crucial precondition12 to the mechanisms discussed 
in this report.  Market segmentation relates to the prevention of physical product 
leakage from poorer to wealthier markets as well as to price leakage, that is, 
when developed countries use equitable prices in their reference pricing systems.  
The more successfully wealthy and poor markets can be separated, the more 
willing firms will be to engage in equitable pricing.  Importantly, this is a point 
on which the interests of industry and of health planners are aligned. 
 
The two primary factors that affect market segmentation are the feasibility of 
price or product leakage from poor to wealthy markets and the incentives for 
various agents to engage in arbitrage by moving equitably priced products from 
poor to wealthy markets, where a higher price can be charged. 
 
The feasibility of price of product leakage from a poor to a wealthy market is a 
function of: 
• The similarity between the marketing mix (product attributes, packaging, 
distribution channel, promotion messages) of equitably-priced and non-
equitably-priced products  
• The strength of the regulatory systems to prevent parallel import of 
equitably-priced products into wealthy countries  
                                                     
10 This correlation is expected on theoretical grounds because companies should be able to make more profits by 
charging  low prices  in  low‐income markets and high prices  in high‐income markets  (discriminatory pricing), 
than by charging a uniform global price. 
11 Médecins Sans Frontières (2002) Untangling the Web of Price Reductions: A Pricing Guide for the Purchase 
of ARVs for Developing Countries, MSF, Geneva. 
12  For  detailed  explanation  of  why  this  is  a  precondition  for  equitable  pricing,  see  Commission  on 
Macroeconomics and Health working paper no 1, Working Group 4, Scherer and Watal. 
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• The geographic proximity between the poor and the wealthy markets13 
• The security of the distribution chain through which equitably-priced 
products flow.   
The incentive for agents to move equitably priced products from poor to 
wealthier markets is a function of the attractiveness of the product to wealthy 
markets and this depends on: 
• The volume of demand for the product in the wealthier market 
• The size of the price differential between the markets (which must be at 
least large enough to cover the transaction costs). 
Armed with this information on the variables that affect the incentive to engage 
in arbitrage and the feasibility of market separation, governments and companies 
can start to construct interventions to minimize the risk. 
                                                     
13  There  is  a  growing  phenomenon  of  US  citizens  using  the  Internet  to  purchase  their  prescribed  drugs  in 
Canada where drug prices are significantly lower.  Thus, one might expect that the Internet, over time, would 
alleviate  the need  for geographic proximity.   However,  since  Internet penetration  is higher  and distribution 
systems more advanced in developed countries, it is likely to remain a developed country phenomenon, rather 
than a trend affecting developing countries, for the foreseeable future. 
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The increased need for equitable pricing 
The increased need for equitable pricing 
Burden of disease  
One out of every ten deaths in the world is due to only three diseases: AIDS, 
tuberculosis (TB) and malaria.  This burden falls almost entirely on the 
developing world. For example, the loss of Disability Adjusted Life Years 
(DALYs) per capita due to HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria is almost 170 times higher 
in Africa than in high-income countries.14   The high disease burden in 
developing countries is slowing economic growth and worsening poverty levels.  
The overall impact of this on the Millennium Development Goals and on poverty 
reduction is very substantial. 
Limited financing 
This high disease burden exists in the context of limited financing.  For 2002-
2005, the total estimated disease-specific financing need for HIV/AIDS, TB and 
malaria alone is around US$ 36 billion.15 Potential national resources are 
estimated to be approximately one third of that amount, leaving a need for c. US$ 
23 billion from international sources.  Currently available international resources 
for the three diseases are estimated to be around US$ 1.5 billion per year, 
indicating a large gap.16  
 
Furthermore, the need for additional resources will continue to grow in the long-
term.  The annual incremental need, over and above current levels of 
expenditure, is estimated to be US $17 billion in 2007 and US $27 billion by 2015.  
A substantial part of this financing would go towards the purchase of medicines.  
Clearly, significant reductions in the prices of these medicines would help close 
the gap between limited finance and unmet need. 
Competitive environment 
The gap between health need and resource availability is occurring in the context 
of:  
• A changing intellectual property (IP) environment  
• A changing technological environment - the switch from chemistry-based 
to biology-based R&D.   
                                                     
14 Global Fund Business Plan submitted to the second Board meeting, April 2002. 
15 Real need  is  likely  to be higher  than  indicated here.   First, estimates reflect  the  initially  limited absorptive 
capacity in many countries, thereby not always showing real underlying need.  Second, costs for R&D and basic 
health infrastructure are generally not included.  Third, low unit cost estimates are often used. 
16 Global Fund Business Plan submitted to the second Board meeting, April 2002. 
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The changing  IP environment  is  likely  to decrease  the  levels of competition  for 
new, patented products, and thus, inhibit the levels of price reductions seen in 
recent years due to competition from generic copies of patented drugs. As 
described more fully in subsequent sections, this will impact directly on the 
effectiveness of some mechanisms for equitable pricing (e.g. compulsory 
licensing) and on others indirectly (e.g. those that are strengthened by the use of 
compulsory licensing as a negotiating tool).  Thus, consideration of the IP 
environment is necessary. 
The changing technological environment is another key factor likely to result in a 
decline in competition.   On the one hand, as medical treatments become more 
tailored to the patient’s genetic make-up, the number of available treatments will 
multiply, as could the number of manufacturers.  On the other hand, entry into 
these markets will require considerable financial and technological resources, 
which few possess.  In particular, the complexity involved in the development of 
pharmacogenomic products, and the diagnostic process of determining for which 
patients the treatment would be appropriate, may preclude a great deal of 
generic competition. There are also questions as to whether drugs created via 
these technologies could be reproducible so that they are ‘bio-equivalent’ to their 
branded counterparts.17  Companies with greater critical mass could therefore 
dominate, controlling products resulting from genomics-based technologies.   
 
Voluntary licensing is the only mechanism discussed in this report that might be 
beneficially affected by the changing IP and technological environment. 
Uganda case study 
To illustrate the need for equitable pricing to go further and deeper, one 
particular country - Uganda, is taken as an example.  In 2000, five pharmaceutical 
companies participating in the UN-sponsored Accelerating Access Initiative 
(AAI) contracted McKinsey & Company to study the existing capacity for 
administering ARV therapy in Uganda and to recommend how to scale-up access 
over time.  (N.B. This study was conducted at a time when the diagnostic and 
monitoring requirements for use of ARVs were much more stringent than current 
WHO guidelines). 
In Uganda, patients pay the full cost of ARV therapy i.e. the drug price as well as 
the complementary care and monitoring costs. Consequently, McKinsey needed 
to project forward the theoretical price elasticity curve for ARV triple therapy, i.e. 
how many patents would demand treatment, given different price points.  They 
constructed the curve by plotting the number of people who pay different 
amounts per month for rent and school fees.  From these data, they plotted a 
best-fit curve (Figure 1) and used this to project the likely demand for highly 
active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) at a given price to the patient (Figure 2) 
and the consequent infrastructure investment required.18  
                                                     
17 Moses, Z. May 2002. 
18 Fine, D., Hazelwood, J., Hughes, D. Sulcas, A., 2001. 
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Figure 1: Price elasticity for ARV drugs in Uganda 
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The results of McKinsey’s analysis are shown in the diagram below: 
Figure 2: McKinsey & Company projections 
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Extrapolation from the McKinsey & Company study 
For the purposes of this report, the McKinsey data have been manipulated to 
address two additional questions:   
1. Given the price elasticity curve in Uganda, what percentage of patients 
currently needing ARV treatment would receive it if a similar public 
investment were required and a similar price elasticity curve held for 
various other developing countries?   
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For this analysis the following assumptions have been made: 
• Within country income distribution is approximately the same between 
Uganda and other countries 
• Within country HIV/AIDS distribution is approximately the same 
between Uganda and other countries 
• Health infrastructure/constraints are the same between Uganda and 
other countries 
• Financing systems (being a mix of public and private user fees) are similar 
in all developing countries, therefore financing is a constraint. 
Table 1 shows the results for a few selected countries. The results differ primarily 
according to two variables; the gross national product (GNP) per capita and the 
HIV rate as a percentage of the total population.  In this model, Cameroon 
reaches a higher percentage of those in need of ARV treatment because its HIV 
rate as percentage of population (as shown in Figure 3) is relatively low and its 
GNP per capita relatively high. 
 
Table 1: Predicted impact 
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three
Nigeria
Kenya
Cameroon
Zimbabwe
S. Africa
Uganda
1%
2%
13%
5%
10%
5%
3%
4%
27%
10%
19%
9%
9%
13%
91%
33%
64%
30%  
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Figure 3: GNP per capita and HIV % of total population 
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2. To what price would ARV triple therapy need to fall in order to treat 
100% of those in need in Uganda?   
Figure 4 shows that in order for 100% of those needing treatment to be able to 
afford it, the monthly total cost of treatment should not exceed US$ 30.61, or US$ 
376 annualized. Furthermore, assuming that the ARV drug cost is 65% of the 
total treatment cost19, the drug cost should not exceed US$ 238 per year. 
When the same question was asked for Ethiopia, which has a relatively higher 
HIV incidence as a percentage of the population and a lower GNP per capita, the 
results (Figure 5) show that the monthly cost of treatment should not exceed US$ 
8.43, or US$ 101 annualized.  Again, assuming that the ARV drug cost is 65% of 
the total treatment cost, it should not exceed US$ 65 per year. 
Conclusion 
The analysis above is intended to be illustrative; limitations in the use of the data 
prevent it from being definitive.  For example, the McKinsey data from which 
this analysis was constructed assumes that those who have HIV/AIDS are those 
at higher income levels.  Thus, the US$ 238 and US$ 65 drug price requirements 
to treat 100% of sufferers in Uganda and Ethiopia respectively, are over-
optimistic.  Despite the limitations of the analysis, it illustrates that prices still 
need to fall significantly if increased access is to be achieved.  
 
                                                     
19 This percentage was taken from  ‘Cost Estimates of HIV/AIDS commodity requirements 2000‐2005’, Options 
Consulting, Barraclough A, et al.  (A study commissioned by UNAIDS).  
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Currently, the lowest prices for ARV triple therapy from generic manufacturers 
are US$ 200 - 300 per year.  This is less than half the price of offers made by 
research-based companies participating in the UN Accelerating Access Initiative 
(AAI).  Presumably, the generic drug manufacturers’ prices could be reduced still 
further if the scale of production was higher.  
 
Increased donor financing would also help Uganda meet its public health need.  
But even with the country’s successful recent bid for US$ 97 million over 3 years 
from the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), 
approximately half of which is allocated towards HIV/AIDS, it is only possible 
to offer ARV treatment to two patients per province.  Even with substantially 
increased donor financing, the need is so great in developing countries that 
further price reduction is needed to achieve substantial access. 
 
Figure 4: Price/demand function for ARV treatment in Uganda 
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Figure 5:  Price/demand function for ARV treatment in Ethiopia 
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Details on each mechanism 
In the following sections of this report, a range of mechanisms is reviewed with 
the aim to highlight their successes and failures, and their potential and 
limitations for achieving equitable pricing. 
Bulk purchasing and competitive tendering 
Definitions 
Bulk purchasing and competitive tendering can be thought of simply as 
purchasing in large volumes.  However, the supply and demand situations in 
which this mechanism is employed vary, so a wider definition is required to 
allow for the idea of well-informed purchasing organizations which may pool 
demand, regularize treatment guidelines, negotiate with suppliers (e.g. for 
longer-term supply agreements or further discounts), and in some cases, make 
efforts to expand the supplier base. 
 
National procurement programmes in many developing countries, lacking 
credible financing, sufficiently large demand, or professional procurement 
approaches may fall into the narrow definition. The price reductions they achieve 
are generally limited compared with international prices.  Organizations such as 
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA; contraceptives), the Global Drug 
Facility (GDF; first-line TB drugs), the Green Light Committee (GLC; drugs for 
multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), and the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization (GAVI) fall into the wider definition of bulk purchasing, as do 
organizations such as the International Dispensary Association Foundation 
(IDA), Echo International Health Services Ltd and UNDP/Inter-Agency 
Procurement Services Office (IAPSO), which pool demand on behalf of smaller 
purchasers.  Such organizations achieve reductions of up to 50% on generic drugs 
and up to 95% on single source and patented drugs compared with international 
prices. 
Experiences with bulk purchasing and competitive tendering 
Country or regional level procurement 
 
There are a number of examples of regional bulk purchasing schemes.  One is the 
Eastern Caribbean Drug Service, established to manage the procurement process 
on behalf of member countries of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.  
This service achieved an average of 44% reduction in price during the first tender 
cycle. Member countries are charged 15% on each order to cover administrative 
costs of the service.  
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The reductions were achieved by incorporating a number of key features:  
• A selective list 
• Pooled quantities  
• Competitive bidding  
• Supplier monitoring and quality assurance  
• Variable purchase quantities by group members  
• Sole-source commitment  
• A reliable payment mechanism.20 
The techniques used by regional procurement groups also affect price reductions 
achieved at country level.  In a comparative study of Southern African 
countries21, Botswana and Mozambique were found to achieve better prices than 
South Africa for TB drugs, despite having a fraction of South Africa’s buying 
volume.  The study also showed that a significant effect on prices is possible 
through a professional approach to the entire procurement function. 
 
GDF 
 
Established in 2001, the GDF pools the demands of countries and procures seven 
first-line tuberculosis drugs, all of which are off-patent.  The purchasing function 
was awarded to IAPSO after competitive tender.  IAPSO manages to achieve 
prices on average 30% lower than Management Sciences for Health (MSH)22 
prices and 50% lower than WHO prices.  A course of first-line therapy for 
tuberculosis which had cost US$ 20, now costs US$ 10.  This compares favourably 
with Brazilian prices (US$ 60), where government protection of local industry 
results in higher prices from local producers.  In terms of current impact, 
approximately 8% of people with TB globally receive their drugs via the GDF, 
although the goal is to reach 80% by 2005.  In order to receive drugs through the 
GDF, countries must qualify by having an appropriate TB Directly Observed 
Treatment Short-Course (DOTS) programme. 
 
GLC 
 
The GLC was formed to address the needs of patients with multi-drug resistant 
TB (MDR TB) through DOTS-Plus projects supported by WHO.  The added value 
of GLC is two-fold:   
• It pools demand, structures partnerships and negotiates on behalf of  
countries in a situation where demand is small and extremely 
fragmented; by 2002, GLC managed to achieve 85 - 99% reductions on US 
                                                     
20 Management Sciences for Health, Managing Drug Supply, second edition, page 172. 
21  ‘TB  Bulk  Purchasing  Study’  conducted  by  Johan  van  de  Gronden,  formerly  with  the  International 
Procurement Agency (IPA), 1999. 
22 Management Sciences  for Health: a D.C. based organization  that  collects price  information and makes  this 
public via  its  Internet site.   MSH prices are widely regarded as being  the closest one gets  to an  international 
benchmark price. 
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prices of the 14 products procured for GLC-endorsed projects.  Drugs for 
an entire 2-year course of therapy now cost US$ 500 - 1500. 
• It provides technical assistance so that the quality of the MDR-TB 
treatment is improved; consequently demand for drugs has been 
stimulated and the delivery system for treatment improved. 
GLC undertakes negotiations tailored to meet the market situation.  Where a 
drug is single-source or patented, GLC takes a two-pronged approach, 
attempting to encourage more suppliers to enter the market23 and to align the 
interests of the existing supplier with those of the programme.  When working 
with monopoly suppliers, GLC communicates the financial commitment of the 
programme and demonstrates the current market size and market potential.  It 
works with the supplier to help forecast demand and sometimes commits to 
large purchase volumes over longer time periods.  Working with suppliers in this 
manner helps reduce their risk, should they need to invest in new capital 
equipment for manufacture. 
 
In terms of impact, only 10 of 17 DOTS-Plus project applications have been 
approved to date.  The approved projects are supported by governments, NGOs 
and, in one project, a private health centre.  Approximately 2% of MDR TB 
patients (based on a conservative estimate from WHO) have received treatment 
through GLC.  The major constraints are the lack of quality of the DOTS-Plus 
projects, as well as the drug costs, which are still prohibitive for LDC health 
budgets. 
 
UNFPA 
 
UNFPA provides an example of the wider definition of bulk purchasing 
described above - a well-informed purchaser who conducts negotiations and may 
also encourage other suppliers to enter the market.  UNFPA takes a competitive 
approach when dealing with generic, multi-source drugs, but finds that a 
partnership approach works best with single-source or patented drugs. When 
dealing with the latter, UNFPA views the tender as the last stage in a long 
process. It realizes that pricing a product is risky for suppliers and therefore the 
more the purchaser can reduce the supplier’s risk upfront, the more the potential 
for price reductions.  Also, the more the risk is reduced in the longer term, the 
more suppliers will be willing to invest in larger batch sizes and changes in 
packaging. 
 
A good example of the price reductions that can be achieved with a partnership-
orientated bulk purchasing arrangement for single-source drugs can be found 
with oral contraceptives.  Although UNFPA pays US$ 0.17 for a generic oral 
contraceptives compared to a US market price of US$ 0.30, it also pays a reduced 
price for single source oral contraceptives; US$ 0.36  versus the US$ 34 US market 
price. 
                                                     
23 This was done  successfully, with  capreomycin and  cycloserine, both  formerly  exclusively produced by Eli 
Lilly.  GLC induced competition and now there are three new manufacturers for each, with price reductions of 
95% and 98% respectively.  GLC was able to induce one new manufacturer for a third drug, called PAS, with a 
price reduction of 70%.  
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GAVI 
 
GAVI shares some common features with GLC and UNFPA in that, through its 
partner organizations, it works closely with the suppliers, attempting to align 
their interests with those of GAVI.  This approach is necessary due to the limited 
number of vaccine suppliers.  GAVI enhances the overall attractiveness of the 
vaccine market by: 
• Stimulating demand in developing markets  
• Strengthening vaccine delivery infrastructure  
• Guaranteeing future purchasing of the product, at least in the short-term. 
A recent study commissioned by GAVI recommended that a project management 
team be set up, overseen by the GAVI Board, and made up of parties from 
UNICEF, WHO, and The Vaccine Fund.  This team will look at all aspects of 
vaccine provision and will engage in: 
• Demand forecasting on a country-by-country basis  
• Timing of the introduction of new vaccines  
• Reviewing the availability of finance  
• A study of global supply as well as supply to UNICEF.   
GAVI’s  approach  aims  to  accomplish  two  things:  through  the  project 
management  team,  to  help  reduce  the  manufacturer’s  risk  of  investing  in 
research  and  production  capacity  that  might  otherwise  end  up  idle,  and  to 
increase  the  bilateral  dependence  between  GAVI  and  suppliers,  thereby 
increasing GAVI’s bargaining power with the suppliers. 
Potential of bulk purchasing to achieve more equitable pricing: 
suppliers’ costs and purchasers’ bargaining power 
From the supplier’s perspective, engaging in bulk purchasing and competitive 
tendering can lower costs and reduce risks through:   
• Reduced risk of capital equipment investment  
• Economies of scale  
• Reduced marketing and distribution costs  
• Better production planning and inventory costs that come with improved 
demand forecasting.   
However, it should not be assumed that these costs would automatically be 
passed on to the purchaser.  The degree to which the cost savings are translated 
into reduced prices depends on the purchaser’s bargaining power. This is a 
function of the competitiveness of the market and the purchaser’s financial 
credibility, market knowledge, and purchasing size, for example.  International 
organizations have a large role to play in helping developing country purchasers 
develop their bargaining power, in the interest of achieving more equitable 
prices.  However, competition for new, patented drugs, currently a significant 
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driver of price reductions, will be reduced after 2006. This is likely to reduce 
significantly purchasers’ bargaining power when they negotiate for these drugs. 
With the advent of major financing initiatives like the GFATM, bulk purchasing 
could take on a larger dimension than currently practised.  At present, GFATM 
does not facilitate bulk procurement on behalf of countries. However it is 
currently considering mechanisms to facilitate the pooling of demand of 
countries with successful bids.  
Voluntary tiered pricing agreements 
Definition 
Voluntary tiered pricing agreements can be defined as agreements where prices 
are based on the supplier’s charity, desire for favourable public relations or other 
criteria not immediately related to market forces. Thus they can be distinguished 
from bulk purchasing agreements where prices are negotiated between supplier 
and purchaser based on market criteria.   
Two examples of voluntary tiered pricing agreements are described in this 
section:  
• Agreements between companies and countries for supply of ARVs; some 
of these agreements are through AAI and some are negotiated directly 
between pharmaceutical companies and developing country 
governments.   
• The agreement between Novartis and developing countries for the 
equitably-priced antimalarial, Coartem, within the partnership 
established with WHO.  
Experience with this mechanism 
AAI 
 
In 1998, the Drug Access Initiative was launched by the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) in partnership with five research-based 
pharmaceutical companies (Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Merck & Co and Hoffmann-La Roche24).  At the end of 2001, 
responsibility for this initiative, renamed AAI, was transferred to WHO.  The 
intention of AAI is to provide developing countries with access to ARV 
medicines at the lowest possible prices and to technical support for the 
implementation of national access programmes for ARV treatment. 
 
The launch of the UNAIDS initiative resulted in participating companies 
reducing their prices for triple ARV therapy from US$ 12 000 to US$ 7000 per 
year per patient.  Around the time when AAI moved to WHO, negotiations 
resulted in further reductions to US$ 1200.  At this point, the Indian generics 
industry entered the scene and offered the same combination for US$ 600.  When 
Côte d’Ivoire announced that it was ready to accept the offer from the Indian 
                                                     
24 Abbott has now joined, so there are now 6 participating companies. 
 21
Equitable Pricing of Newer Essential Medicines For Developing Countries 
manufacturer Cipla, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck made a further price 
reduction to US$ 800.   
 
Currently, four Indian generic companies25 offer triple combination therapy at 
less than half of the lowest price offered by companies participating in AAI.   As 
of April 2002, the lowest generic price for triple combination therapy was US$ 
209.26
 
Since May 2000, 80 countries have expressed interest in AAI.  In 39 of these, 
national plans to improve access to care have been, or are being, developed.  
These plans have been used as a framework for dialogue with the pharmaceutical 
companies, and consequently, 19 countries27 have concluded agreements for the 
supply of ARV drugs with individual companies participating in the AAI.28  
Despite this interest at country level, the actual number of patients receiving 
ARVs through AAI remains disappointingly low - less than 1% of the HIV-
positive population currently needing ARV treatment.29  As of December 2001, 
about 27 000 people have gained access to ARV therapy in the 19 participating 
countries.  The only numbers available as of March 2002 are for Africa and are for 
drugs supplied by the participating pharmaceutical companies both within and 
outside the AAI framework.  These show that about 35 000 people have access.  
UNAIDS data also reveal that the proportion of patients on triple combination 
therapy increased from one third to nearly two thirds of patients receiving any 
ARV therapy through AAI.  The following factors have constrained the impact of 
AAI: 
• High price of ARVs: Despite major reductions in prices, the ARVs offered 
through the six24 AAI participating companies are still more than double 
the prices offered by generic companies; the cost of ARV treatment still 
exceeds the annual GDP per capita of many LDCs.  Some have argued 
that middle-income countries have benefited most from the AAI price 
reductions achieved to date because of their lower incidence of HIV 
infection, higher per capita incomes, and therefore ability to take 
advantage of the price cuts.30 
• High price of diagnostic test kits and reagents, many of which are 
branded, needed for biological follow-up. 
                                                     
25 Cipla, Hetero, Aurobindo, Ranbaxy. 
26 Médecins Sans Frontières (2002) Untangling the Web of Price Reductions: A Pricing Guide for the Purchase of 
ARVs for Developing Countries, MSF, Geneva. 
27  Barbados,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Chile,  Republic  of  Congo,  Cote  d’Ivoire,  Gabon, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mali, Morocco, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, and Ukraine. 
28 UNAIDS,  Accelerating  Access  Initiative,  Widening  Access  to  Care  and  Support  for  People  Living  with 
HIV/AIDS. Progress Report. June 2002. 
29 Estimated to be approximately 15‐ 20% of those infected with HIV.  WHO conservatively estimates that in 
2002,  around  6 million people  in developing  countries  are  in need of ARV  therapy.  (UNAIDS, Accelerating 
Access  Initiative, Widening Access  to Care and Support  for People Living with HIV/AIDS. Progress Report, 
June 2002.) 
30 For example, with an HIV infection rate of 1.5%, universal access in Chile would cost 0.5% of GDP, compared 
with 17% in some sub‐Saharan African countries. 
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• Weak health systems and infrastructure: The condition placed on the 
LDCs by patent holder/suppliers that they must have capacity to use 
ARVs rationally and control their distribution would theoretically limit 
the numbers accessing treatment.  However, in reality many of the 
countries have under-utilized health system capacity that could be used 
to expand treatment today.  While investments in health and social 
service infrastructure are certainly needed, health systems constraints are 
likely to be more of a limiting factor later if there are attempts to increase 
ARV access on a much larger scale.31   
• Lack of standardization in the dialogue between countries and 
pharmaceutical companies after plan of action development (especially 
lack of standard prices and conditions).  Negotiations and informal 
discussions have slowed the process of implementation. 
• Technical support needs exceeding supply of available personnel to offer 
technical support.32 
• Limited demand for AAI in some countries possibly because generic 
drugs are increasingly available as an alternative: Côte d’Ivoire, Jamaica, 
Nigeria and Uganda are some examples of countries taking advantage of 
generic supply.  Uganda’s largest ARV care facility offers both generic 
and branded drugs. 
• Approximately half of one patent holder’s 80+ agreements to supply 
ARVs at equitable prices are outside the AAI framework.  This indicates 
that some groups prefer to approach the patent holder directly. 
Approximately 30 - 40% of this same patent holder’s sales are to 
customers outside the public sector such as employers and NGOs; it is 
believed that these groups are less likely to approach industry through a 
UN framework. 
 
Coartem 
 
Coartem is an antimalarial licensed by Novartis from China, which was 
conceived as an equitably-priced product from the early stages of its 
development. It has been registered under two different brand names with 
different prices and different packaging: Coartem in poorer, malaria-endemic 
countries and Riamet in wealthier, non-endemic markets.  In wealthy markets, a 
course of Riamet costs US$ 40, whereas as Coartem, it is available in the private 
sector of malaria-endemic developing countries for US$ 12 and in a paediatric 
package at around US$ 8.  A third category of product is available only through 
WHO and is for use only in the public sector (including approved not-for-profit 
private sector facilities) of malaria-endemic developing countries.  This product 
costs US$ 0.9 - 1.90 for paediatric usage, depending on the size of the child.  The 
adult dose costs US$ 2.4. 
 
                                                     
31  UNAIDS,  Accelerating  Access  Initiative,  Widening  Access  to  Care  and  Support  for  people  Living  with 
HIV/AIDS. Progress Report.  June 2002. 
32 Harmonization of care delivery would facilitate ability to offer integrated technical support and would allow 
resources stretch further. 
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Novartis always recognized that this product would have limited commercial 
potential and this made it ideal for the company’s first experiment in working 
with China, where it has since become one of largest multinationals in operation.  
The capacity and relationships built through the development of Coartem are 
now being used for other products Novartis manufactures and markets in China.  
 
Coartem has only been introduced on a pilot basis to date.  In South Africa, 
where 24 000 patients used the drug in 2001, there was an 80% reduction in the 
number of malaria cases reported over the year and hospital admissions for 
malaria fell from 40 000 to 10 000 between 2000 and 2001.  However, some of 
these dramatic results are believed to be due to the introduction of bed nets 
impregnated with pyrethroids and insecticide spraying, in addition to Coartem.33  
Likely constraints to the voluntary tiered pricing agreement for Coartem having 
greater impact in future are:  
• The fact that the substantially reduced price is only available through the 
public sector, whereas it has been well documented that patients access 
their malaria medications primarily through the private sector in 
developing countries.  
• Given that the incentive and feasibility for leakage from poor to wealthy 
markets within developing countries is high for this product, there is a 
risk that the product will be diverted from public sector facilities (where it 
is free or highly subsidized) to private pharmacies (where it is likely to be 
marked up in price). 
However, from Novartis’s perspective, there are more benefits than costs to this 
deal and these are summarized in Box 1. In the case of Coartem, WHO has 
worked very closely with Novartis and has a good understanding of the benefits 
and costs of the partnership from the company’s perspective.  The contributions 
WHO has made to the partnership have been very transparent and WHO has 
increased its bargaining power as a result. 
                                                     
33 Dr. P Olliaro, World Health Organization, personal communication. 
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Box 1: Summary of costs and benefits to Novartis in the Coartem voluntary tiered 
pricing agreement 
 
Costs  Benefits 
Transaction costs (costs of managing the 
business  relationship)  of working with 
WHO and with each country. 
Spill‐over  benefits  in  terms  of  capacity‐
building and relationships that facilitated 
market  entry  for  other  products 
manufactured and/or sold in China 
Opportunity  costs  (foregone  benefit  of 
other  business  opportunities)  of  tying 
up scientific and management time with 
a  product  having  limited  commercial 
potential. 
Public  relations:  this product  features  in 
the corporate social responsibility section 
of Novartis’s company literature. 
 
Potentially  extra  costs  in  developing 
differentiated  packaging.    (In  fact, 
WHO  specifically  asked  Novartis  to 
find  a  way  to  achieve  different 
packaging without any additional  cost, 
and Novartis was successful in this). 
Branding  (indirectly)  because  the 
equitably‐priced  product  given  through 
the public sector can help build demand 
for  the  more  expensive  product  that  is 
sold  in  the  private  sector  in  malaria‐
endemic countries. 
Potential  risk  of  committing  capital  to 
production  capacity,  but  Novartis  has 
minimized  this  risk  by  investing  in  a 
modular fashion. 
Support from WHO with: 
• Expert reviews (decreases 
scientific risk); 
• Partial  funding of Phase  IV  trials 
to determine appropriate dosages;
• Skill transfer with packaging; 
• Global forecasting; 
• A credit  fund  to help developing 
countries pay for Coartem; 
• In‐country infrastructure 
requirements to collect 
pharmacovigilance and post‐
marketing ‐ surveillance data;  
• Monitoring  leakage  (on  a  sample 
basis,  through  a  survey  of 
pharmacies); 
• Application  to  the  WHO  Model 
List of Essential Medicines.  (Such 
a  listing  helps  attract  public 
funds). 
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Voluntary tiered pricing negotiations: conclusions  
 
In order to be able to fully understand the incentives operating in each of these 
partnerships, it would be necessary to deconstruct each on a company-by-
company, drug-by-drug and country-by-country basis.  Manufacturing capacities 
and benefits and costs to each party differ and thus few general conclusions can 
be drawn.  However, when the examples of voluntary tiered pricing agreements 
described above are reviewed, some concerns become apparent, as summarized 
below. 
 
Transparency 
 
In these agreements, pharmaceutical companies negotiate directly with 
governments or other approved health service providers on a country-by-
country basis, each in an independent way, without any supervision by UN 
agencies.  Governments are usually required to keep these agreements 
confidential and all media communications are handled by the company. This 
means that the AAI label is attached to, and serves as a guarantee for, 
negotiations over which WHO and UNAIDS have little information and power.   
 
There have been allegations that companies are using these agreements to 
leverage other goals.  For example, the contract with Bristol-Myers Squibb is 
structured to appear like a drug donation34; however the company says that it is 
not applying for tax credit35.  Some agreements have also been restricted to very 
specific drugs, quantities, countries, distribution sectors and medical settings; 
they have also been tied, allegedly, to commitments by developing country 
governments to adhere to IP requirements in excess of those stipulated in the 
TRIPS Agreement.   
 
Distortions 
 
These agreements do not follow the WTO trend to remove restrictive practices, 
and many organizations allege that they distort the competitive environment, 
buying a monopoly for the participating companies at the expense of generic 
manufacturers.  Similarly, there is an issue of distorting national procurement 
networks.  For years, WHO has been promoting the creation of national central 
purchasing offices, which work on the basis of transparent public tender.  AAI 
however, supports the signing of contracts between Ministries of Health and 
pharmaceutical companies, resulting in a parallel procurement system, a lack of 
competitive bidding and transparency as regards prices.  
 
Transaction costs 
 
The costs of managing AAI agreements are high for recipient countries 
(developing an action plan; going through qualification), for the international 
organizations managing the AAI programme (providing technical assistance; 
evaluating and approving countries for participation), and for the private 
suppliers (negotiating these agreements on a country-by-country basis).  The 
                                                     
34 The recipient gets the drug free but pays a US$20 ‘administration fee’ per bottle. 
35 Bob Lefebvre, personal communication. 
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prices through AAI (still higher than generic prices), and access (AAI currently 
reaches less than 1% of the HIV/AIDS population needing treatment) would 
need to be improved in order to justify these transaction costs. 
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Price reductions and impact on access 
 
The price reductions, access impact, disease and product scope for voluntary 
tiered pricing agreements, AAI in particular, have been limited.  The fact is that 
substantial price differences still exist between branded and generic products 
(indicating that branded products might not be priced at marginal cost) and these 
medicines are still unaffordable.  In terms of disease and product scope, tiered 
pricing offers have been rare for medicines other than those for malaria and 
HIV/AIDS.  In terms of access impact, the sheer number of patients receiving 
medicines through AAI has been extremely low - less than 1% of the patients 
needing treatment.   
 
Incentives 
 
An overall concern underlying many of the above points relates to incentives 
inherent in the AAI structure and the consequent potential for impact enabled by 
these incentives.  Unlike GAVI and the GLC, the AAI does not work with any 
organizations to pool demand or negotiate on behalf of member countries. GAVI 
and GLC36 rely more on market mechanisms – researching the benefits and costs 
of their suppliers and how they can create deals that are beneficial to each party.  
The same can be said of the partnership between WHO and Novartis; there is a 
fair degree of bilateral dependence, thus both sides had power and Novartis 
consequently had the  incentive to make many investments specific to the 
agreement, such as differential packaging.  But as AAI is currently structured, the 
purchaser (LDC government) does not gain any bargaining power over the 
suppliers.  There is no pooling of demand.  Pricing is left to the discretion of the 
innovator pharmaceutical companies.  The only possible leverage that LDCs have 
is generic competition, but the use of this as a bargaining tool, after 2006, will be 
limited to older, off-patent drugs.  It is suggested that international organizations 
have an important role to play in structuring voluntary tiered pricing agreements 
in ways that increase the bargaining power of LDCs. 
 
Sustainability 
 
Concerns about the sustainability of AAI efforts compound concerns about AAI’s 
incentive structure.  Many allege that the factors that have led to agreements such 
as AAI include threats of compulsory licenses, extraordinary and unsustainable 
NGO and UN pressures, and the existence of a competitive market for ARVs 
(also unsustainable, at least for new, patented ARVs, after 2006).  The fact that 
Roche, one of the AAI participants, has so far refused to grant price discounts on 
its HIV products for which there are no generic competitors, supports this latter 
point, as do findings from large-scale studies.37  If competitive market pressure 
                                                     
36  In  terms of price and access  impact,  it can also be said  that  the  cocktail of drugs needed  to  treat MDR TB 
remains  unaffordable  to  many  LDC  governments,  and  that  the  percentage  of  patients  treated  very  small.  
However,  the  difference  between  MDR  TB  and  HIV/AIDS  is  that  the  market  for  MDR  TB  in  developing 
countries  is much  smaller  and more  fragmented  than  that of  the HIV/AIDS market,  so one would  expect  a 
greater challenge in achieving price reductions and access impact.   
37  In  a  study  of  drug  prices  for  ten  essential AIDS  drugs  in  eight  countries,  Perez‐Casas  of Médecins  Sans 
Frontières (MSF) found that the price of AIDS drugs was 82% less than the US price in the developing countries 
with access to generic copies of on‐patent drugs.  According to Perez‐Casas, ‘The presence or absence of generic 
competition  in  the market  is a key determinant of pricing  levels.’ Also, a  recent  study  in  the US  found  that 
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and public/media interest eventually decrease,  and in the absence of more 
sustainable, market-based incentive structures, AAI-type agreements may fail to 
live up to their potential. 
 
Benefits of AAI 
 
Despite concerns about transparency, sustainability, distortions, and transaction 
costs relative to price reductions and impact, the AAI programme has provided a 
few benefits. The quality of ARV therapy among the beneficiaries seems to have 
improved (i.e. more patients are now taking triple combination therapy).  Also, 
many health workers have gained experience with use of ARVs for the first time 
through AAI, offering potential for greater impact if only the medicines became 
more affordable.38 The technical support provided by UN agencies to developing 
country governments is a further benefit provided by the AAI programme.  
These are potentially very important benefits in the context of the weakest health 
systems in the poorest countries, where the dangers of a large volume of ARVs 
irresponsibly used could be grave. 
                                                                                                                                                 
prices  fall when generic  competition enters  the market, but at  least  five generic  competitors are necessary  to 
push prices down to a minimum. (Reiffen, D. & Ward, M. 2002, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics). 
38 UNAIDS, Accelerating Access Initiative, Widening Access to Care and Support for People Living with 
HIV/AIDS. Progress Report, June 2002. 
 29
Equitable Pricing of Newer Essential Medicines For Developing Countries 
Improving bulk purchasing and voluntary tiered pricing agreements  
What economic theory39 tells us about structuring business 
relationships 
Contracts and economic institutions should be structured in a way that minimize 
ordinary production costs (such as land, labour, capital) as well as the costs of 
administering an ongoing business relationship.  The latter are real economic 
costs, referred to as transaction costs, and include the costs of negotiating and 
writing contracts, monitoring contract performance, costs of enforcing 
contractual promises, and costs associated with breaches of contractual promises.   
 
Some characteristics of transactions tend to raise transaction costs; these include 
the extent to which the transaction is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, 
information asymmetries and the extent to which the transaction requires one or 
both parties to make transaction-specific (idiosyncratic) sunk investments.  
Where the transaction has any of these characteristics, governance structures, 
such as vertical integration or other partnership structures that align incentives 
and increase bilateral dependency, should be sought. 
Application to the examples in this report  
When a purchaser is working with a supplier in a situation where there is 
sufficient therapeutic competition for a drug, information asymmetries are low 
(there are competitors who will offer alternative prices and therapeutic options), 
and the purchaser and supplier have relatively equal bargaining power.  The 
degree of competition and information parity makes a ‘market’ exchange type of 
relationship with the supplier efficient. 
 
In contrast, when the purchaser is contracting with a supplier of single-source or 
patented drugs, information asymmetries are higher (the purchaser is less able to 
determine what is the marginal cost of producing the product since he/she 
cannot get any comparative price information).  The supplier consequently has 
more bargaining power, based on his/her monopoly position.  The purchaser 
should therefore seek to adapt his way of working with the supplier in line with 
the characteristics of the relationship and in order to increase his bargaining 
power.    
 
Specific tactics that help a purchaser gain bargaining power within single-
source/patented contexts include:  
• Working to increase the supplier base (as in the GLC example from the 
previous section) 
• Investigating the situation of the supplier, with the goal to reduce 
information asymmetries.  This investigation would ideally reveal the 
supplier’s marginal production cost, the benefits and costs of the 
relationship from the supplier firm’s perspective as well as the benefits 
and costs of his alternative strategies.  Ideally, this would involve a very 
                                                     
39 See Williamson; Joskow; Hart and Moore; Klein, Crawford and Alchian. 
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detailed study of the industry structure as well as the value chain within 
the specific firm.40 The purchaser should look for ways that he can create 
value for the supplier, and with the goal to appropriate some of that value 
creation in the form of price reductions. 
• Attempting to create a situation of bilateral dependence, rather than the 
unilateral dependence that currently exists.  One way of doing this with 
monopoly suppliers, as discussed previously, is via increasing the 
supplier’s dependency on the purchaser, or creating ‘sticky’ transactions.  
Bilateral dependency should be the goal when a purchaser is working 
with a single or few suppliers and is therefore already unilaterally 
dependent.  Bilateral dependence (stickiness) is increased when, for 
example, suppliers agree to invest in product development and 
packaging specific to the contractual relationship (as in the Coartem 
example) or when suppliers, having confidence in the demand forecasts 
and availability of finance, invest in capital equipment to scale-up  
manufacturing (GLC example).  Bilateral dependence can also be 
achieved when the purchaser and supplier commit to large volume 
purchases, or increase the frequency or duration of their contract.  The 
earlier examples of how UNFPA, GAVI and the GLC work with suppliers 
show that these methods are indeed effective approaches in 
monopoly/oligopoly supply situations. 
• Providing assistance which is valuable to the supplier in the form of 
public funding or technical expertise to aid in product development 
(Coartem example). 
The way AAI is structured shows a lack of adherence to economic theory.  AAI 
countries sign Memorandums of Understanding with the suppliers of patented 
or single-source drugs in situations where they have no bargaining power.  The 
bargaining power of these countries would be higher if either they tried to 
establish a more competitive approach, through fostering legitimate41 generic 
supply, and/or if they could improve their bargaining power through creating a 
greater degree of bilateral dependence with monopoly suppliers.  The latter 
could be achieved if the demands of the LDCs were pooled, and if companies 
competed for the pooled demand and for long-term contracts to supply a 
product. 
Operational tactics for managing suppliers 
The previous section discussed how adapting the type of contracting structure 
(or way of working with suppliers) to the transaction characteristics (particularly, 
the degree of uncertainty and supply/demand context) increases the chance that 
the following objectives can be met:   
• Motivating each side to make efficient investments in resources and effort 
                                                     
40  See Michael Porter’s Competitive Advantage,  1985,  chapters  1&2  for more detail  on  the  firm  value  chain 
concept and structural analysis of industries. 
41  Generic  supply  is  legitimate  where  the  patent  has  expired  or  in  situations  where  the  generic  product  is 
produced in a country not yet required to implement patent law under TRIPS and the product is imported by a 
country not yet required to implement patent law under TRIPS. 
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• Promoting efficient decision-making, which enables achievement of 
public health objectives 
• Minimizing the potential for either party to behave opportunistically  
• Allowing the opportunity for adaptation should circumstances change.   
At the operational level, there are certain tactics that can be employed to improve 
the bargaining power of purchasers, regardless of whether a competitively - or a 
monopoly-supplied product is being sourced.  For example, it is commonly 
believed that the volume of products procured is the most significant driver of 
price discounts achieved in bulk purchasing.  In fact, volume gets more attention 
than it should.42  One comparative study of procurement practices and prices 
achieved in country level procurement programmes of 10 Southern African 
countries proved this point.43  The study found a lack of positive correlation 
between buying volume and low price levels of anti-tuberculosis drugs; rather, 
low price levels seemed to be a result of proper, open international bidding 
procedures.  High prices were a result of poor specifications, supplier selection 
method and restrictive competitive practices, bad planning, donor dependence 
and temporary funding shortages (the latter two often related).  The report 
concluded, ‘If we really want to achieve substantial improvements, a broader look 
on the whole procurement function is inevitable, including the underlying policies, 
the way we assess our needs and the manner in which we specify.’  Thus, specific 
tactics that may enable a purchaser to improve bargaining power within both 
competitive and monopoly supply environments include: 
• Providing credible financing, or good payment terms in general 
• Pooling demand (this lowers marketing, distribution, and transaction 
costs for suppliers while simultaneously increasing the bargaining 
leverage of the purchaser)  
• Improving quality assurance capacity (or participating in a demand pool 
that has upgraded capacity) 
• Improving market knowledge (e.g. when WHO or others compile price or 
quality assurance information, this reduces information asymmetries) 
• Engaging in professional procurement practice: good knowledge of the 
market, good choice of products, good generic specification, good pre-
qualification criteria. 
Summary 
A variety of contractual strategies can be used by purchasers in an attempt to 
create efficient transactions.44  The most efficient situation from a neo-classical45 
                                                     
42 The opinion of both Johan A. van de Gronden, Director, UNDP/IAPSO as well as Henk den Besten, Director, 
IDA, personal communication. 
43 TB Bulk Purchasing Study conducted by Johan van de Gronden, formerly with the International Procurement 
Agency (IPA), 1999.  
44 We can define efficient transactions here as transactions that achieve pricing as close to the marginal cost of 
production  as  possible,  while  minimizing  transaction  costs  and  maintaining  incentives  for  each  party  to 
continue with the relationship over the long term. 
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as well as a transaction cost46 viewpoint is that of competition.  In a competitive 
environment, the information available to purchasers on competitors’ prices 
increases the purchasers’ bargaining power, facilitating pricing that is closer to 
the marginal cost of production. 
 
Where competition is not possible, the purchaser must research and understand 
the incentives of the suppliers, thereby raising transaction costs, but with the goal 
to prevent subsequent problems in the relationship.  Understanding the costs and 
benefits of the partner is essential in order to know how to align the incentives of 
both parties and to prevent subsequent opportunism on the part of the supplier, 
who has greater bargaining power.  Strategies that seek to create ‘sticky’ 
relationships, or relationships where each party is dependent on the other, may 
help to align incentives and equalize bargaining power in this environment. 
 
At the operational level, there are also certain tactics that can be employed to 
improve the bargaining power of purchasers, regardless of whether a 
competitively - or a monopoly-supplied product is being sourced.   
Voluntary licensing 
Description of the mechanism 
Voluntary licensing, in the context of equitable pricing, refers to the situation 
whereby an innovator pharmaceutical company licenses a patent, for purposes of 
local production, to a third party company in a lesser developed country, with 
any of the following goals: 
• To reduce costs  
• To pass the savings on to the consumer in the form of an equitably-priced 
product 
• To aid in market segmentation through a differential product registration 
and marketing mix47 compared to that used in a wealthier market  
• To facilitate technology transfer and upgrading of local manufacturing 
capacity 
• To promote the initiative as an example of the company’s corporate social 
responsibility. 
According to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS48 Agreement, developed countries have an 
obligation to provide incentives that promote and encourage technology transfer 
to enterprises and institutions in LDCs.  Theoretically, this obligation means that 
developed country governments would provide incentives for patent holders to 
engage in local production and perhaps, voluntary licensing.  However, LDCs 
have repeatedly raised concerns at the Council for TRIPS about the lack of 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 That is, achieving prices near to production costs in order to maximize health impact. 
46 That is, the costs involved in constructing and managing the business relationship. 
47 The marketing mix refers to the price, product characteristics (product attributes, packaging), and distribution 
channel and promotion/marketing strategy. 
48 The Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
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effective action by developed countries to comply with this article.  Paragraph 7 
of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health reaffirmed the commitment 
of developed-country members to Article 66.2. Paragraph 11.2 of the 
Implementation Decision adopted on November 14th 2001 sets out a mechanism 
for monitoring whether these incentives are put into place.49 However, it remains 
to be seen to what degree this mechanism will be effective in holding developed 
countries accountable for achieving their obligation. 
Feasibility of voluntary licensing 
In fact, innovator companies engage in local manufacturing in developing 
countries all the time, but with goals which may differ from those outlined 
above, i.e. to:  
• Obtain cost savings from the use of local labour, local materials, or 
adherence to less stringent regulatory regimes, but with the goal to 
appropriate the gains from those savings for shareholders, rather than 
customers 
• Take advantage of ‘perks’, such as grants or tax relief, offered for local 
production by developing country governments   
• Facilitate easier/wider product reimbursements, or easier local product 
registration 
• Have the potential for shorter cycle times, faster response to marketing 
requirements, less inventory and lower overhead and logistics 
• Have the potential for tax management via healthy margins on the 
internal transfer price at which primary materials are ‘sold’ to countries 
with relatively higher tax environments 
• Establish a market presence and brand reputation in a market that is 
perceived to have rapidly expanding demand and good future potential. 
When an innovator company works with a domestic pharmaceutical company, 
this may involve licensing patents to a third party.  However, in countries where 
local production capacity is sufficient to produce higher technology drugs, and 
where local demand is rapidly growing, the more common model is for the 
innovator to approach the market through locally-owned affiliates. 
However, it is not always the case that producing locally is less expensive.  This 
depends on such factors as: which part of the production occurs locally (primary 
or active ingredient manufacture50; secondary; or tertiary); the relative capital to 
labour ratio (production requiring higher fixed costs may be less expensive if 
centralized to capture economies of scale); and the level of investment needed to 
raise the quality/technology level of the local manufacturer.  Furthermore, for 
voluntary licensing to contribute to equitable pricing, cost savings achieved in 
producing locally should be passed on to consumers, rather than appropriated 
                                                     
49 Correa, C. Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, June 2002, WHO 
publication. 
50  The  primary,  active  ingredient  stage  is  the  most  scale  intensive  stage,  and  is  the  one  most  likely  to  be 
centralised.  The minimum efficient scale for secondary (e.g. pill pressing) and tertiary (packaging) production 
varies by product, but is usually substantially less than that of active ingredient production. 
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for investors. This is problematic since it relies on charity.   The idea that patent 
owners have an incentive to upgrade the manufacturing and technology capacity 
of third party companies in developing countries for purposes of passing savings 
to consumers also assumes a charitable tendency.  In fact, the opposite is likely to 
be true; companies making product or process advances have every incentive to 
keep these proprietary.  Finally, the idea that innovator companies have the 
incentive to create lower-priced competition for the higher-priced, branded 
products with which they usually ‘skim’ the market in these countries also belies 
the way they usually approach lower-income markets. 
 
 
Variations on the voluntary licensing theme 
 
A variation on the voluntary licensing theme put forward by the Commission for 
Macroeconomics and Health, proposes that these licenses should be awarded on 
a competitive basis.  This is not the way innovator companies conduct business at 
present and there are obvious reasons why patent holders would oppose such an 
idea.  Even if they did agree, in order for the mechanism to work, there must be 
sufficient demand in developing countries to generate sufficient competition for 
the licenses. This may not be the case. First, companies that are capable of high 
technology work in countries that are not required to implement patent 
protection until 2006 are not required to have a license to produce copies of 
patented products until then. This limits demand for licenses at present.  Second, 
there are only a few developing countries with several companies capable of high 
technology work, so the required level of competitiveness after 2006, will only be 
possible in a few countries. 
 
In another variation to the voluntary licensing idea51 licenses would be awarded 
on a competitive basis not just for local manufacture, but internationally.  Thus a 
firm in Canada, for example, might be licensed by the patent holder to 
manufacture medicines for export to developing countries.  This option gets 
around many of the practical and economic hurdles of licensing to a developing 
country producer.  However, the question remains as to whether there are 
sufficient incentives for innovator firms to engage in such licensing for important 
products on a wide-scale basis.  For important products, patent holders may 
prefer not to license generic manufacturers based in developed countries, 
preferring to keep proprietary products or processes secret. 
Experience with this mechanism 
Despite concerns about the feasibility of voluntary licensing outlined above, 
some examples can be found. In early 2001, the Indian generic manufacturer, 
Cipla, approached the five companies involved in AAI, seeking voluntary 
licenses to manufacture patented products.  All the patent owners refused52 and 
Cipla went on to produce generic ARVs (as described previously). However, 
there are some positive examples of voluntary licensing.  
 
                                                     
51 Friedman, M., den Besten, H. Attaran, A. 2003. 
52 Charlish, P., The Provision of Drugs to Developing Countries: Implications of Global Property Rights.  Scrip 
Report. 21 November 2001. 
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The first example of an arrangement that worked like a voluntary license 
occurred when Hetero, an Indian manufacturer, struck a deal with Aspen 
Pharmacare in South Africa, to supply active ingredients and the technology for 
the manufacture of finished products of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s ARVs stavudine 
and dianosine.  Aspen Pharmacare subsequently received an undertaking from 
Bristol-Myers Squibb that it would not sue the South African company if it 
produced copies of its ARVs for distribution in South Africa and 47 other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  This was tantamount to granting Aspen a 
voluntary license to produce these drugs.53
 
There are three subsequent examples of the use of voluntary licensing as a 
mechanism to achieve equitable pricing.  Boehringer Ingelheim licensed Aspen 
Pharmacare to produce nevirapine and GlaxoSmithKline agreed to license three 
ARVs to Aspen Pharmacare. Aspen will be allowed to import active ingredient 
from the producer of its choice, engage in secondary and tertiary manufacturing 
in country under GlaxoSmithKline’s license, and sell only to approved NGOs 
and government.  Aspen must pay 30%54 royalties to a local NGO, rather than to 
GlaxoSmithKline. 
 
When asked why GlaxoSmithKline did not engage in this kind of arrangement 
more routinely, the answers were (pers comm.) that there have not been many 
requests to GlaxoSmithKline for licenses and that local producers must be able to 
produce the drug for less than GlaxoSmithKline.  These conditions are not often 
met, according to one of the company’s representatives.55
 
Another example of voluntary licensing was announced recently and is the first 
example of a non-exclusive license being offered with the aim to provide product 
to several developing countries.  Pharmacia, in partnership with IDA, will grant 
non-exclusive licenses for an ARV, delavirdine, to generic manufacturers who 
agree to produce and supply the medicine to countries with a per capita Gross 
National Income of less than US$ 1200 or an HIV infection rate of more than 1 
percent.56 The non-exclusivity and multiple country targets of this offer provide 
more potential than previous voluntary licensing examples; however, 
delavirdine’s importance in HIV treatment is relatively less than other medicines 
on which Pharmacia and its parent company, Pfizer, own the patents.     
 
To conclude, all of the examples of voluntary licensing to date offer fairly limited 
scope in increasing access to medicines, i.e. the drug’s importance in disease 
treatment, the target population, and/or the opportunity for multiple licensees to 
participate have been limited.   
                                                     
53 Charlish, P., The Provision of Drugs to Developing Countries, Scrip Reports, Strategic Management Series, 21 
November 2001. 
54 This is a relatively high royalty rate, when compared with what has historically been used as a royalty rate on 
pharmaceuticals  for  compulsory  licensing.    Canada  applied  4%  across  the  board,  for  example,  when 
compulsory licensing was used routinely in that country. 
55 An example was given of a request recently turned down due to the fact that production by the third party 
firm,  in  Zimbabwe,  would  have  been  more  expensive  than  GSK  could  achieve  via  centralized  production. 
(Chris Strutt, GSK, personal communication). 
56 Pharmacia Press Release, January 24, 2003. 
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Future prospects 
 
Despite the problems, voluntary licensing does have some prospects.  First, after 
2006, when current producer countries have implemented patent protection, 
there may be more demand for licenses due to new regulatory constraints as well 
as the need to gain experience with genomics-based technologies.  Second, 
expanding the more narrow ‘voluntary licensing’ idea to a more wide-ranging 
‘local production’ idea could theoretically accomplish many of the same 
objectives as licensing to a third party.57 It has the advantage of being more in 
line with the way that patent holders usually conduct their business in 
developing countries, i.e. through locally-owned affiliates with sufficient 
technology capacity allowing for local production.   
 
As an example, the anti-ulcer drug, Zantac, was sold by the patent holder, 
GlaxoSmithKline, at about US$ 2.80 for 300mg in the USA at the time of patent 
expiry in early 1996.  At the same time, GlaxoSmithKline’s local affiliate in India 
sold the same product, under the brand name Zintec, for less than US$ 0.6 in this 
very competitive market.58  It is not known to what degree the product was 
manufactured locally, nor to what degree technology was transferred, but this 
example shows at least that the market segmentation objective can just as easily 
be accomplished through locally-owned affiliates as through third party 
‘licensees.’   
Levers for governments and international organizations 
This mechanism sits strangely with the others discussed in this report because it 
is part health policy and part industrial policy.59 If voluntary licensing is 
conceived as truly voluntary, then governments and international organizations 
have no direct ability to implement the mechanism; they can only offer 
incentives.  If governments want to provide incentives to innovator companies to 
engage in voluntary licensing (or local production, which may be able to 
accomplish the same objectives), the most feasible levers they can employ are 
those that encourage foreign direct investment.  Less feasible ways would be 
either through mechanisms to ensure that developed countries meet their TRIPS 
obligations to transfer technology or through using compulsory licensing (see 
below) as a bargaining tool to encourage voluntary licensing as a preferable 
alternative. 
                                                     
57 These objectives being cost savings, if applicable, differential product registration and differential marketing 
mix, as well as raising domestic production capacity. 
58 Lanjouw, J., Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries.  Forthcoming in: 
Innovation Policy and the Economy. Vol 3, 2002. April 9, 2002 draft version. 
59 Some might argue that it is bad industrial policy if it encourages countries to deviate from their comparative 
advantage; others look upon comparative advantage as a dynamic process and would see the encouragement of 
technology transfer as the first step on the ‘value‐added’ ladder. 
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Compulsory licensing 
Definition 
Compulsory licensing is defined as ‘authorization permitting a third party to 
make, use or sell a patented invention without the patent owner’s consent’. 
Feasibility 
Compulsory licensing is potentially an important instrument that is allowable, 
according to TRIPS, under certain conditions.60  On a very practical level, no LDC 
has yet invoked a compulsory license, so there remains doubt as to whether it is a 
workable safeguard of TRIPS. In order to be used effectively, several practical, 
legal, economic and technological constraints need to be addressed.   
 
Legal constraints 
 
The prospect of a legal battle may deter LDCs from using this mechanism.  If 
compulsory licensing is implemented in an overly legalistic manner, it will be 
expensive to administer and may be easily manipulated.  In addition, there do 
not seem to be reliable rules on royalty compensation; such rules would make 
compulsory licenses easier to administer and speedier to implement.   
A further legal hurdle involves the  interpretation of TRIPS as to whether patent-
respecting countries with manufacturing capacity would be able to export to 
countries without production capacity when the latter issue a compulsory 
license.  Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (Box 2) instructs the Council for 
TRIPS to report to the General Council before the end of 2002 with an 
expeditious solution to the problem of how Member States with insufficient 
manufacturing capacity can make effective use of compulsory licensing. Some 
Paragraph 6 options were presented at the session of the Council for TRIPS held 
in March 2002.61  However, all options require diplomatic negotiations, rely on a 
number of conditions for successful implementation, and carry a number of 
negative considerations. No agreement had been reached as at February 2003.   
 
It is the author’s view that a legal solution may not prove sufficient to make 
compulsory licensing workable; resolution of the practical, economic and 
technological hurdles must be sought as well.    
 
 
Box 2 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: Paragraph 6 
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in 
the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS 
to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council 
                                                     
60 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement sets forth a number of conditions for the granting of compulsory licenses 
(case‐by‐case  determination;  prior  negotiation,  in  certain  cases,  with  the  patent  holder;  remuneration,  etc.) 
although it does not limit the grounds on which such licenses can be granted, leaving Members full freedom to 
stipulate the grounds for themselves.  
61 A moratorium  on WTO  complaints/disputes  against  countries  that  export  some medicines  to  countries  in 
need, under certain conditions. 
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before the end of 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3 
To illustrate the legal hurdle to the use of compulsory licensing, imagine that an 
LDC, e.g. Malawi, decides to issue a compulsory license for a new ARV in 2006.  
Since Malawi would not have the capacity for manufacturing such an advanced 
product, it would need to look to another country – such as India - for a low-cost 
version of the patented product.  Since the ARV is a new, patented product, the only 
company engaged in the manufacture of this product after 2006 would be the 
innovator company itself.  Malawi would be within its rights to grant a compulsory 
license for the importation of goods that are under patent in its own territory, as long 
as the imported goods have been produced in a country where they are not patented, 
or where the term of protection has expired.  Since India is required to implement 
patent protection in 2005, it would be disqualified to supply under the current 
interpretation of TRIPS.  Since the patent would exist in India, the patent holder may 
block exports from India to the importing country – Malawi in this example.   
 
Further, since Article 31 (f) of TRIPS requires that a compulsory licensee supplies the 
domestic market predominately, the provision would prevent the granting of a 
compulsory license mainly to export to a country in need of medicines.   
 
These are the legal challenges that would prevent a country like India from being 
able to produce medicines for export, under a compulsory licensing request, to a 
country like Malawi, after 2006. 
 
 
Economic hurdles 
 
Even if a Paragraph 6 agreement is reached regarding the definitions of 
‘predominately’ and  ‘the domestic market’ which resolves the scenario outlined 
in Box 3, economic and technological hurdles remain which would hinder the 
ability of LDCs to implement compulsory licensing for new products after 2006.62   
 
Returning to the example in Box 3, questions remain such as:  
• Does the compulsory license Malawi issued to serve its local market form 
a sufficient incentive for a company, e.g. in India, to invest in the 
development of a copy of the patented product?   
                                                     
62 Since  the patent holders will  recognize  these economic and  technological hurdles,  the  lack of  resolution of 
these hurdles would hinder the ability of LDCs to use compulsory licensing as a negotiating tool as well.   
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• Is the market large enough to warrant the production of the active 
ingredient(s)?   
The manufacture of active ingredients and the start-up costs of developing a 
patent copy are the two most scale-dependent parts of the pharmaceutical 
production process. It is unlikely that the scale of the Malawi market alone 
would provide an incentive for a patent copier company to develop and 
manufacture a product even if, through resolution of Paragraph 6 of Doha, this 
scenario is legally acceptable.   
 
One solution to the economic problem would be for countries like Malawi to 
team up with other LDCs and issue joint, systematic and predictable compulsory 
licenses as a group.  This might give sufficient scale and predictability to warrant 
market entry by a patent copier firm.  A second possibility is if producing 
countries, like India, issue compulsory licenses for their own domestic market.  A 
larger, wealthier market like India would be more attractive and thus would be 
more likely to provide the incentive for a domestic patent copier to enter and 
serve the market created by the compulsory license.   Once the product has been 
developed, and the start-up costs recovered from large domestic sales, then the 
patent copier could supply other countries that issue compulsory licenses, such 
as Malawi. 
 
Technological hurdles 
 
Another barrier is technological. The increased use of biology-based R&D and 
the complexity involved in the development of pharmacogenomic products 
means that meeting regulatory bio-equivalence requirements will likely be 
problematic.  Such tailored products would require increased diagnostics ability 
and extensive monitoring, requiring a strong customer service component.  These 
sorts of investments would be problematic for generic companies63 and may 
result in decreased generic competition over time. One solution would be to 
enforce the technology transfer conditions in Article 66.270 of the TRIPS64 
Agreement.  This would theoretically create manufacturing capacity in the 
country in need; however, this would be a longer-term solution and not an 
‘expeditious’ one as envisaged under Paragraph 6.  
Experience with compulsory licensing 
The credible use of compulsory licensing as a negotiating tool is what makes it 
effective in the current environment, as evidenced in Brazil in its negotiations 
with Merck over ARVs, and the US government with Bayer over ciprofloxacin.  
In fact, ciprofloxacin was subject to a fast-track form of compulsory licensing, 
called ‘government use’ provision, similar to the UK ‘Crown Use’.  Thus, public 
health in the USA and UK is safeguarded by ‘government use’ and ‘Crown Use’ 
powers respectively, and these powers have been invoked when necessary.65   
                                                     
63 Moses, Z. May 2002. 
64 Article  66.2  of  the Agreement  on Trade‐Related Aspects  of  Intellectual Property Rights  obliges developed 
countries  to  provide  incentives  that  promote  and  encourage  technology  transfer  to  enterprises  in  least‐
developed countries.   
65 For example, in 1965, the UK government exercised the Crown Use provisions to import a generic version of 
tetracycline from Italy to supply the NHS after its patent holder, Pfizer, had demanded too high a price.  Pfizer 
v. MoH 1965 RPC 261 (HL). 
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The UNDP Human Development Report 2001 states:  
 
“Strong government use provisions: The TRIPS agreement gives governments 
broad powers to authorize the use of patents for public non-commercial use, and 
this authorization can be fast-tracked, without the usual negotiations.  No 
developing country should have public use provisions weaker than German, 
Irish, U.K. or U.S. law on such practice.66” 
R&D effect 
Innovator pharmaceutical companies allege that compulsory licensing has a 
strong negative effect on their incentives to invest in R&D for medicines that 
have been the target of compulsory licenses.  The International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations quotes two industry leaders as 
saying that ‘if enthusiasm for compulsory licenses becomes great, there will soon 
be no more patents on AIDS drugs to compulsorily license – because new 
product development in this critical field will decline dramatically’.67  However, 
it is difficult to imagine how compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs in developing 
countries would so substantially affect incentives for R&D, given the fact that 
Africa represents only 1.2% of the global pharmaceutical market and AIDS is a 
global disease, for which R&D expenditure is recovered in wealthy markets.68   
The real issue may be lack of market segmentation and consequent fears that 
compulsory licences will erode pricing power in developed markets. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although a resolution for Paragraph 6 of DOHA has yet to be agreed, concern 
remains that the legal system may not be able to provide a solution that would 
address the practical, economic and technological hurdles.  Unless these are 
comprehensively addressed, the effective use of compulsory licensing for new 
products post-2006 is likely to be hindered. 
                                                     
66  http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/chapterfive.pdf, page 107. 
67 http://www.ifpma.org. 
68 Attaran, 2001. 
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Delaying or reversing patent protection 
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted by 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in November 2001, affirmed that the TRIPS 
Agreement should be interpreted and implemented so as to protect public health 
and promote access to medicines for all.  One of the agreements reached as part 
of Doha was that LDCs would not be required to implement patent protection on 
pharmaceuticals until 2016 (see Box 5).   
 
Box 5 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: Paragraph 7 
We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country members to provide 
incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage 
technology transfer to least-developed country members pursuant to Article 66.2. 
We also agree that the least-developed country members will not be obliged, 
with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 
of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these 
Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the right of least-developed 
country members to seek other extensions of the transition periods as provided 
for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to 
take the necessary action to give effect to this pursuant to Article 66.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
 
 
If LDCs could take full advantage of this extension, this would be a very effective 
mechanism in the short-term to achieve equitable pricing.  However, the 
following paragraphs describe why the extension will have very little meaning in 
practice.  
 
Of the 30 LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa, only Angola and Eritrea do not currently 
observe patent protection on pharmaceuticals.69  Some countries observe patent 
protection through regional groupings, e.g. the Bangui Agreement of the 
Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle (OAPI).  This Agreement 
was initially developed in 1977, revised in 1999, and is binding on all 16 West 
African Member States.  It resulted in an IP protection regime which is much 
stronger than the minimum level required by TRIPS.  For example, Bangui 1999 
allows parallel importing only among Member States, despite the fact that 
medicines can be found at lower prices outside the OAPI region.  For example, 
one tablet of GlaxoSmithKline’s Combivir, a one-pill combination of the two 
ARVs Zidovudine and Lamivudine, costs US$ 1.96 in Togo and US$ 0.94 in 
Senegal (lowest price within the OAPI region), but only US$ 0.65 in India.  
According to TRIPS requirements, Togo would be allowed to import from 
India,70 however, Bangui 1999 restricts Togo to importing from Senegal – at a 
price that is 45% higher than that in India.71.  In addition, Bangui 1999 does not 
                                                     
69  Presented  by  Carlos  Correa  at the March 28 conference, Implementation of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health: Technical Assistance – How to Get It Right. 
70 TRIPS does not govern countries use of parallel importation, as was clarified in paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration. 
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allow compulsory licensing for imports and has extended patent protection on 
pharmaceuticals from 10 to 20 years.   
 
Thus the Bangui Agreement has resulted in a situation where the 12 LDC 
Member States72 are complying with TRIPS now rather than delaying to 2016.  It 
would be nearly impossible to rescind the Agreement as all the 16 members 
would have to agree. 
 
Other countries have instituted patent protection in response to bilateral 
pressures, before being required by TRIPS.  For example, Chile, Indonesia, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, Thailand, and the Andean Group of countries 
amended their patent laws from 1984 onwards in response to a revision of the US 
Trade and Tariff Act.  This Act authorized the US government to take retaliatory 
action against countries failing to give adequate protection to IP. 73 Although 
politically unlikely, if these developing countries were able to reverse their 
current levels of patent protection, this mechanism would be very successful in 
bringing down prices before 2006.   
 
After 2006, however, such a reversal carries similar economic challenges to the 
compulsory licensing mechanism.  That is, although the LDCs not required to 
respect patents could legally import the generic copies of patented drugs, there 
would be less capacity on the market to produce copies of new, patented drugs, 
since most of the producing countries will be observing patents as of 2006.  Thus, 
the lack of patents in small developing countries is irrelevant if these countries 
cannot import a low-cost generic version due to patent protection in the 
producing countries.     
 
In summary, the 2016 delay would be more valuable pre-2006 if most of these 
countries had not already implemented patent protection, and post-2006, if a 
reliable supply of low-priced copies of newly patented medicines continued.  
Since neither of these conditions applies, delay or reversal of patent protection 
has little meaning to developing countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
71 Example presented by Catherine Gavin, legal advisor to Médecins Sans Frontières, at the March 28 conference, 
Implementation of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Technical Assistance – How to Get It 
Right. 
72 Of the 16 countries in OAPI, 4 are considered to be developing countries and 12 are LDCs, the latter having until 2016 to 
implement TRIPS in full. 
73 Drahos, P. 2002. 
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Systematic, government-led patent waivers74
Description of the mechanism 
Government-led patent waivers are semi-voluntary mechanisms to achieve 
equitable pricing.  They are to be distinguished from company-led patent 
waivers, whereby the patent holder decides where and when it is (or is not) of 
commercial interest to register patents.  Due to their unpredictable nature, 
company-led patent waivers would not provide sufficient certainty to generic 
manufacturers to enable entry into production of new medicines.  Company-led 
patent waivers would therefore have little potential for equitable pricing, and are 
not discussed here.  The mechanism described in this chapter is a more 
systematic, semi-voluntary variation on this theme, whereby when registering its 
patent in major developed markets, a company would sign a declaration that it 
will not sue for patent infringement in LDCs for products to treat ‘global 
diseases’. That is, for diseases which affect both poor and wealthy countries and 
where R&D recovery is expected to come from major developed markets. 
Premise 
The premise underlying the idea of patent waivers is that new pharmaceutical 
patents, coming into force with TRIPS implementation, promise benefits and 
costs that differ with the characteristics of diseases.  Some diseases (‘local 
diseases’) primarily affect developing countries, and for treatment of these, 
patents will not be sufficient to attract substantial private investment because 
purchasing power is low.  However, globally-available and well-defined patent 
rights could increase the benefits derived from greater public financing75 of 
research on pharmaceutical products for the developing world.  In contrast, the 
justification for extending patents in developing countries is less clear for major 
‘global diseases’ – those which affect both poor and wealthy markets.  Thus, 
patent waivers differentiate the protection given to products in accordance with 
their widely differing global markets, as illustrated in Figure 6.   
 
The mechanism of government-led patent waivers, if politically feasible, would 
provide an economically logical, global framework for pharmaceutical patents 
and an optimal balance between static efficiency (access to existing medicines at 
affordable prices by those who need those medicines) and dynamic efficiency 
(the ability to meet health need in the longer-term) for countries at different 
stages of development.   
                                                     
74  Jean  Lanjouw,  Commission  on  Macroeconomics  and  Health,  Working  Paper  Number  11,  Group  2.    A 
Proposal to Use Patent Law to Lower Drug Prices in Developing Countries. 
75  The  presence  of  a  patent  system  in  a  developing  country  would  be  useful  to  publicly  financed  ‘pull’ 
programmes,  that  is, programmes that promise to pay for a specific product with defined characteristics only 
once  it  has  been  developed.    Since  no  innovation  is  made  by  one  person  perfectly  at  one  time,  but  rather 
cumulatively  in  bits  and  pieces  by  many  firms,  the  presence  of  a  patent  system  i)  provides  incentives  to 
individual  firms  for all  these  tiny  innovations, and  ii) allows  the  firms  to decide amongst  themselves how  to 
cross license appropriately.  In the absence of a patent system, the ‘pull’ purchase fund would have to figure out 
a way  to  grapple with  defining which  inventors  have  contributed  the most  novelty  to  the  innovation,  and 
therefore, what  compensation each  should  receive.   These decisions would be very difficult  for  the purchase 
fund  to make,  and  this might undermine  the  required  certainty  that  the  fund must  convey  convincingly  to 
potential donors. 
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Figure 6: Conflict between price/access to existing medicines and incentives 
to develop new ones 
Wealthy markets
Poor markets
‘Global’ diseases ‘Local’ diseases
R&D not recovered here
therefore favour 
Price reductions/access
to existing medicines over 
R&D incentives (via patents)
R&D recovered here
therefore favour R&D 
Incentives (via patents) 
over price reductions
R&D recovered here, 
in niche markets
therefore favour R&D 
Incentives (via patents) 
over price reductions
R&D recovered here
therefore favour R&D 
Incentives (via patents)
over price reductions
Will be necessary to utilise other 
mechanisms to address insufficient 
R&D incentives, despite patents
(e.g. ‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms) 
as well as inability of poor countries 
to pay prices which recover R&D
(e.g. increased financing)
 
How it would work 
The patent waiver declaration form would look something like Box 6.  
 
Box 6: Example of a patent waiver declaration  
 
I, the undersigned, request a license to make foreign patent filings covering the 
invention described in US patent application no. X, with the understanding that this 
permission will not be used to restrict the sale or manufacture of this drug for 
countries with income and/or human development index of less than X.  
 
 
Once the patent owner has signed the patent waiver declaration form, then if a 
patent copier enters the market, e.g. in India with an ARV, the innovator 
company has two choices:  
• Sue the patent copier for patent infringement, and by doing so, lose the 
patent in the developed markets76  
• Ignore the patent infringement and by doing so, retain the patent in the 
developed markets.  
The patent holder will obviously choose the second of these. Thus, by signing 
such a declaration, the innovator company will be essentially waiving patent 
rights for the specified medicine in qualifying LDC countries. 
                                                     
76 He would lose his patent in the developed country where he signed such a declaration by virtue of the fact 
that he has not abided by  the agreement, and  therefore he would  invalidate  the declaration, and with  it, his 
patent. 
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With this mechanism, protection could be allowed to continue increasing 
worldwide in situations where stronger incentives to invest in research could be 
important (for local diseases), but not in those where the marginal increase in 
profits derived from LDC markets would be unlikely to generate innovation (for 
global diseases). 
 
The real challenge with this mechanism comes in how one determines which 
drugs and which LDC countries should be included in the waiver.  The most 
logical and fair approach would be to specify a range of diseases, from global to 
local, and a range of countries, from wealthy to poor.  This could be done in three 
steps:  
 
Step 1: Identify broad groups of developing countries e.g. by GDP tiers, called 
country groups A, B, C, etc. 
 
Step 2: Identify appropriate diseases for each country group and calculate, using 
data on pharmaceutical sales by disease class, total world sales and sales in each 
of the country groups A, B, C, etc.  
 
Step 3: Include in disease class list 1 all country groups where the sales are less 
than 2% of world sales, and similarly for disease lists 2 and 3. 
 
Where sale of medicines in a disease class contribute less than 2% of world sales 
in a country group, patent waivers would apply and where a disease class 
contributes to more than 2% of sales, patent waivers would not apply. 
 
For the poorest of poor, probably all disease classes would qualify and effectively 
no patent protection would be afforded to pharmaceuticals in those countries.  
The declaration could evolve each year to reflect changes in pharmaceutical 
markets and the economic development of countries. 
R&D effect 
Since Africa represents 1.2% of the global pharmaceutical market,77 it is difficult 
to imagine how lack of patent protection there for global diseases would affect 
companies’ profits and hence ability to invest in further research.  Even where 
diseases like HIV/AIDS are prevalent in less wealthy countries, inability to pay 
makes effective demand low, and hence profit potential low.  However, lack of 
market segmentation is likely to be the larger issue for the patent holder. 
Political feasibility 
Only a handful of drugs recoup their development costs and most companies 
rely heavily on a limited number of successful drugs to finance continuing R&D.  
The fact that 90% of prescription drugs generate less than US$ 100 million 
annually supports this statement.78  Consequently, companies have an incentive 
to care about patent protection and possible price erosion primarily as it affects 
sales of  “blockbuster” drugs in wealthy markets.   
                                                     
77 Attaran, 2001. 
78 Datamonitor research quoted in The Pharmaceutical Industry Paradox: A Strategic Analysis of the Counter‐
trends of Consolidation and Fragmentation, Reuters Business Insight, Zelik Moses. May 2002. 
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Patent waivers would apply in LDC markets to products that are marginal profit-
makers for the patent holders as well as to blockbuster drugs.  Because they 
apply to the latter, patent waivers may therefore be seen as very threatening to 
the research-based pharmaceutical industry in an environment where market 
segmentation cannot be guaranteed.  If it could be assured that leakage of 
products and of prices could be prevented, companies might accept patent 
waivers when they apply to global diseases in LDCs.  However, as long as there 
is doubt that market segmentation can be achieved, research-based companies 
will presumably do all that is within their power to protect the pricing and 
patents of their large money-earners. 
Pros and cons of government-led patent waivers 
Pros: 
• High initial but low ongoing transaction costs: implemented once, 
updated yearly.  Uses existing patent registration systems;  
• No amendments to TRIPS required; 
• Current instability and negative press received by research-based 
multinational pharmaceutical companies could be resolved with a global, 
systematic and fair framework; 
• Transparency and predictability good for planning purposes both for 
generic producers and research-based multinationals; 
• Prices of medicines to treat local diseases would likely remain the same, 
or increase; prices of medicines to treat global diseases would decline 
(current competitive environment continues to grow);  
• The market for drugs to treat such global diseases as HIV/AIDS, cancer, 
heart disease and diabetes would retain its current level of 
competitiveness in lower income countries. These diseases already 
account for 16 % of all DALYs lost in low- and middle-income countries.  
This is four times the DALYs lost to malaria.79 Governments could save 
money on HIV/AIDS, cancer and heart disease drugs that could be 
redeployed towards purchasing drugs to treat ‘local’ diseases, such as 
antimalarials; 
• Since the market for drugs to treat ‘global’ diseases  would retain its 
current level of competitiveness, incentives for R&D for global drugs 
would remain as they are currently. 
 
Cons: 
• Mechanism relies on political will of major developed countries (e.g. 
those in the European Union, Japan, USA) for implementation;  
• Would require an international treaty, therefore time-consuming and 
politically difficult;  
                                                     
79 World Health Organization, (1999) The World Health Report. Statistical Appendices. Geneva. 
 47
Equitable Pricing of Newer Essential Medicines For Developing Countries 
• Unless market segmentation can be assured, research-based 
pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to support any mechanism that 
threatens their large markets;  
• R&D incentives for drugs for local diseases increase only if implemented 
in parallel with ‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms.80 
Government-led price controls 
The idea of price controls is not a new one.  The mechanism summarized here is 
not a global price control system, but rather, the idea of price controls levied at 
national level, with each government choosing how to administer the system and 
to which drugs the controls apply.  Price controls could be implemented in the 
context of a public purchasing programme, or could be levied at the pharmacy 
retail level, or both. 
Pros and cons 
Pros:  
• Price controls do not require any modification to TRIPS.  The 
strengthening of worldwide IP protection could continue for all 
pharmaceutical products as required by treaty; 
• Price control regulation is already a feature of the pharmaceutical markets 
in both rich and poor countries.  Hence, although firms may not like the 
idea, the principle of regulating prices is not likely to be challenged in the 
international arena; 
• Price controls levied at national level could not logically be used as a 
rationale for developed country reference pricing systems.  This 
mechanism would therefore partially solve the market segmentation 
problem; 
• The innovator company which chooses to serve the price-controlled 
market would retain control over distribution, and therefore control the 
colour, shape and size of products manufactured and distributed in poor 
countries; this lessens the opportunities for the production of counterfeit 
goods or the possibility that these products can be easily exported to 
developed countries (again, good for market segmentation).  Control over 
distribution also means that the innovator can perform the necessary 
pharmacovigilance. 
                                                     
80    ‘Push’  or  ‘Pull’ mechanisms  refer  to different methods  of  subsidizing  research with public  funds.    Push 
mechanisms subsidize research  inputs up  front, while pull mechanisms promise  to pay  for a specific product 
with defined characteristics only once it has been developed.  See Kremer 2001 for details.  
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Cons:  
• Developed countries which use price controls successfully (known as 
evidence-based purchasing or reference pricing) do so in conjunction with 
large public financing programmes.  Thus, the purchaser has a certain 
degree of leverage that makes the price control more or less acceptable to 
the supplier.  LDCs, with smaller scale, might not have the same leverage. 
• Assuming that costs can be correctly ascertained and prices fixed on a 
cost-plus basis, regulating through price controls demands continuous 
monitoring to ensure that price ceilings are not evaded by manufacturers 
or retailers.  This is difficult for countries with limited regulatory capacity. 
The experience of Colombia and India  in monitoring costs and enforcing 
prices has been poor.81  
• Price control decisions would be made within a domestic context, 
therefore subject to political pressures; decisions may be made based on 
political logic rather than on economic/health logic. 
• The transaction costs are likely to be very high with this approach; price 
disputes will surely go on between governments and companies.  
Governments will want to see the company’s costs and might threaten to 
issue compulsory licenses should communication break down. Patent 
holders would retain control over sales in the developing world market 
and could, if controlled prices were viewed as too low, simply keep 
patented products off the market altogether.82 
Summary 
Government-led price controls would be effective in reducing prices but may 
result in withdrawal of the products from the market, thereby reducing access.  
This could theoretically be minimized by:   
• Restricting the use of price controls to public sector purchasing where the 
government has relatively more leverage because of the large bulk being 
purchased  
• Using compulsory licensing as back-up to this mechanism.   
The impact of price controls on R&D could be negative, but this would depend 
on the size of the market and on the products to which the mechanism is applied.  
Application in the poorest countries and towards products to treat global 
diseases should have a less negative impact on R&D investment decisions, if 
market separation can be achieved.  Simulation studies which applied Indian 
price controls to 1994 price data, showed that such price controls, where effective, 
leave consumers better off while leaving patent owners only negligibly worse off.  
In particular, price decreases for widely used patented pharmaceuticals that have 
                                                     
81 Scherer, F. M. & Watal, J. (2001), pgs.49‐53. 
82 This already happens.  Recently the head of Pfizer announced that the company would threaten to withhold 
new  treatments  for France unless  the government would allow higher prices.   Similar  threats were put  into 
practice in Pakistan during 2000, when government price controls (levied at retail pharmacy level) had not kept 
up  with  inflation  and  new  import  taxes,  and  therefore  were  seen  as  too  restrictive  by  MNCs,  and  many 
products were consequently withdrawn  from  the market.   Under current  rules, a  refusal  to supply might be 
sufficient to trigger the national emergency provision allowing compulsory licensing.   However, as discussed, 
compulsory licensing may not be economically feasible for some countries, unless certain conditions exist. 
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few substitutes would increase consumers’ surplus significantly.83
                                                     
83 Watal, 2000. 
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Framework for comparative analysis of 
equitable pricing mechanisms 
Criteria for assessing impact of the mechanisms 
The equitable pricing mechanisms discussed in this report have been evaluated 
against a variety of parameters (Figure 7), starting with the mechanism’s 
effectiveness in bringing prices to the lowest possible level and the effect on 
incentives to invest in R&D for new drugs.  The former can be thought of as static 
efficiency -- access to existing medicines at affordable prices by those who need 
those medicines, and the latter as dynamic efficiency -- the ability to meet health 
need in the longer-term. 
 
Any policy discussion around the mechanisms should start from the recognition 
that static and dynamic efficiency are in conflict in this instance.  The conflict is 
not, as is sometimes thought, between corporate profits and public health, but 
rather, between two equally important public health goals - widespread access to 
existing drugs and the maintenance of incentives to create new ones.  Incentives 
to create new drugs are sustained by patents and these in turn sustain higher 
prices; thus, dynamic efficiency is improved but static efficiency suffers.  
Conversely, widespread access to existing drugs – static efficiency – is enabled 
when more consumers can afford to purchase goods incorporating new 
innovations. 
 
The public policy dilemma is how to balance static and dynamic efficiency – that 
is, making new medicines affordable to all those who need them, whilst retaining 
strong incentives for investing in development of new and better treatments.  
Ideally, the balance between static and dynamic efficiency should differ 
according to:  
• The wealth of the country 
• Whether the access problem relates primarily to diseases present in both 
wealthy and poor countries, or those primarily found in poor countries.   
In small LDC markets,84 where demand for products to treat global diseases adds 
only marginally to the profits of multinational pharmaceutical companies and 
hence has, at most, a small impact on their R&D decisions, the balance would 
favour static efficiency.  Thus, mechanism(s) that keep patented medicine prices 
at the lowest level consistent with international obligations would be employed.   
 
In practice, different institutions and policy-makers will have different political 
constraints and operational realities, and thus an optimal economic framework 
                                                     
84 The volume of demand  for health products may be very  large  in many LDCs, but  the  lack of purchasing 
power makes the effective demand, in revenue terms, very small. 
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may not be feasible.  For this reason, a variety of equitable pricing mechanisms 
are needed. 
 
The mechanisms described in this report have been assessed according to a range 
of factors (see below). It is not appropriate to attempt to assign numerical values 
to the analysis; rather, the analysis is meant to be illustrative and should be read 
critically with the accompanying notes ( see section ‘Detail behind the analysis’) 
which explain why the ranking has been assigned.  An attempt has been made to 
be exhaustive to allow the options to be compared in a more systematic way. 
Inevitably, however, the criteria will have different importance to different 
readers.  For example, patent waivers are evaluated positively on most 
parameters, but since it seems unlikely that such a mechanism would be 
acceptable to the US government or the European Commission, those positive 
benefits have no way of materializing.  Thus, for readers who are most concerned 
with the practically optimal model rather than the economically optimal model, 
the low ranking for ‘political feasibility’ for patent waivers would counteract all 
of its high rankings on the other measures.   
Figure 7: Summary of impact of different mechanisms according to 
selected criteria 
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Detail behind the analysis 
Price reduction 
 
What has been, or is likely to be (where the mechanism has not yet been applied) 
the effect on static efficiency, or price reductions? 
 
Chapter 8 of this report provides details of price reductions that have been 
achieved with different mechanisms that are already in use. It is not possible to 
draw a general conclusion that says ‘Mechanism X will deliver a price reduction 
of Y.’  It is only possible to show specific examples in their context.  Mechanisms 
that restrict patent protection (e.g. compulsory licensing, patent waivers) will 
have a significant impact on reducing prices where a competitive market for the 
medicines exists.  The price reductions achieved with bulk purchasing, voluntary 
tiered pricing agreements, and voluntary licensing are more context-specific and 
will depend on such factors as the relative bargaining power of the 
purchasers/suppliers as well as the way in which the mechanism is 
implemented.  Experience with voluntary tiered pricing agreements has not 
shown to be very effective in achieving equitable prices; drugs offered through 
these agreements are not affordable to the recipient populations and do not 
appear to be priced at marginal cost.   
 
Two mechanisms, bulk purchasing and patent waivers, best meet the criteria of 
having a high impact on reducing prices, while having a low negative impact on 
R&D investment decisions.  Although compulsory licensing and delaying patent 
protection have been graded ‘high’ on price reductions, this is a theoretical 
grading.  In reality, due to the lack of feasible implementation (pre 2006 due to 
political infeasibility and post 2006 due to economic infeasibility) their impact 
would be minimal.  The impact of price controls on price reduction depends on 
such factors as the drugs and markets to which they are applied, and the capacity 
of government to implement and monitor the price controls.  Potentially, price 
controls could be very effective means of achieving price reductions. 
 
Impact on R&D 
 
What has been, or is likely to be (where the mechanism has not yet been applied) 
the likely effect on dynamic efficiency, or incentives to invest in further R&D? 
 
In order to determine the degree of negative impact on R&D investment 
decisions, it is necessary to know in which countries, and to which products, the 
equitable pricing mechanism would be applied as well as the extent of price 
reduction.  If the mechanism is applied in LDCs and towards medicines to treat 
global diseases, the negative effects would be limited.  If applied in relatively 
higher income developing countries to treat diseases for which R&D costs cannot 
be recovered in wealthy markets (local diseases) then the R&D impact would be 
much more negative.  It is assumed that voluntary mechanisms have a minimal 
negative impact on R&D incentives because they are voluntary. In addition there 
is evidence indicating that research-based companies are not pricing at marginal 
cost with these voluntary mechanisms, and therefore would not seem to be losing 
money by offering equitable prices.   
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Product scope 
 
Is this a mechanism that would affect the price and R&D incentives of patented  
products only (narrow), or both patented and generic drugs (wide)? 
 
The equitable pricing mechanisms reviewed in this report would generally have 
more effect in reducing prices for patented drugs than for generics, although 
bulk purchasing and price controls are effective for reducing prices on both.  
Patent waivers, compulsory licensing and delayed patent protection would affect 
patented drugs only.  Although voluntary licensing and voluntary tiered pricing 
agreements have the potential to be applied to drugs other than just those that 
are patent protected, their actual use thus far has been narrow; they have been 
limited to supply of patented drugs only. 
 
Disease scope 
 
Would the mechanism preferentially affect drugs to treat local (narrow), or 
global (medium diseases or is it non-preferential, affecting all categories (wide)? 
 
Bulk purchasing and voluntary tiered pricing agreements have been applied to 
treatments for both global and local diseases.  Demand for voluntary licenses is 
likely to be higher for global diseases.  Compulsory licensing can be applied to 
medicines for both global and local diseases, although it is more economically 
feasible to find suppliers if the request is for a global disease (the same goes for 
delays in patent protection).  Patent waivers would affect prices for patented 
global drugs and therefore generic entry and prices for these preferentially.  The 
IP environment for local diseases would remain strong with patent waivers, 
restricting generic entry and consequently price reductions.  Price controls could 
be applied to products for global and local diseases alike.   
 
Purchaser scope 
 
Could this mechanism be used only by institutional purchasers, such as 
governments or large NGOs, to bring down prices (narrow scope), or it is a 
mechanism that could be used by the private sector or by individuals, thereby 
affecting prices on the market as a whole (thus, wider in scope)?  
 
Voluntary tiered pricing agreements and compulsory licensing are, by their 
nature, restricted to institutional purchasers, restricting the scope of buyers that 
can make use of the mechanism.  Bulk purchasing is a mechanism that can be 
used in both private and public sector.  Delayed patent protection, price controls, 
patent waivers, but to a lesser degree, voluntary licensing, are mechanisms which 
could affect prices throughout the market – including those paid by private, for-
profit entities.   
 
Domestic manufacturing 
 
Would the existence of domestic manufacturing capacity facilitate the use of this 
mechanism (yes/no)?  
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Domestic manufacturing capacity is not needed to take advantage of bulk 
purchasing, voluntary tiered pricing agreements, price controls, delayed patent 
protection or patent waivers.  It is necessary in order to take advantage of 
voluntary licensing as a mechanism.  Depending on how the Doha Declaration is 
interpreted regarding exports to LDCs without manufacturing capacity, domestic 
manufacturing capacity may also be necessary to take advantage of compulsory 
licensing.  
 
Population/income 
 
Does this mechanism work better where populations are larger and/or incomes 
are higher (yes/no)? 
 
In theory, bulk purchasing works better where populations are larger, although 
some countries achieve better price reductions that larger countries85 due to more 
professional, less restrictive, procurement practices.  Voluntary tiered pricing 
agreements have so far been more beneficial to higher income countries, because 
price reductions have not been sufficient for LDCs to take full advantage of the 
opportunity.  In principle, however, there is no reason why voluntary tiered 
pricing agreements could not go further in aligning prices with ability to pay – 
whereby countries with lower incomes and smaller populations could be offered 
lower prices. Voluntary licensing is also more feasible where incomes and 
populations are higher, since domestic manufacturing capacity tends to be more 
prevalent in this environment. 
 
The use of compulsory licensing as a negotiating tool has so far been effective in 
countries with production capacity (e.g. Brazil) and relatively larger populations 
and higher incomes, although smaller LDCs could theoretically use compulsory 
licensing as a negotiating tool at present.  After 2006, the feasibility of a LDC 
invoking a compulsory license for new, patented products will decline 
substantially because of the diminishing base from which to import generic 
copies of new patented products.  However, if economically possible, it is more 
likely to be politically acceptable (less apt to attract legal retaliation from patent 
holders) in poorer countries, and it is more likely to be economically feasible 
where populations are larger (therefore offering sufficient scale to a generic 
patent copier).   
 
Delayed patent protection and patent waivers would be preferentially applied to 
poorer countries with smaller populations. With patent waivers, the patent 
protection the country must observe changes over time as the national economy 
develops. Price controls can be implemented regardless of the population/ 
income level. 
 
Scale of access 
 
Is the number of patients who would have access to lower prices via this 
mechanism, low, medium or high?  
 
                                                     
85 See the example, a comparative study of Southern African countries, given in the Bulk Purchasing chapter of 
this report. 
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As indicated in previous chapters, the improvement in access has been low with 
voluntary tiered pricing agreements for HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria and high 
with bulk purchasing. 
 
The scale of access is a direct function of the degree of price reduction relative to 
income as well as the degree of restrictions placed on recipients and the levels of 
investment needed in complementary infrastructure.  These points are discussed 
in the case study of access to ARVs in Uganda.  It is fairly obvious that if less 
public funds go towards high drug prices, then there will be more funds 
available for investment in infrastructure.  As for other diseases that are treated 
through existing healthcare infrastructure (e.g. malaria and childhood illnesses), 
the increase in access when drugs are publicly funded should be nearly 
proportional to decreases in price.   
 
Assuming that there is sufficient demand for voluntary licenses, and a 
willingness of patent holders to supply such licenses for equitable pricing 
purposes, then voluntary licensing might bring down prices in countries with 
sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity, increasing access in those countries.  
The scale of impact on access achieved through compulsory licensing is 
theoretically high, but likely to be low in practice, given its political and legal 
limitations pre-2006 and its lack of economic feasibility post-2006.  Delaying or 
reversing patent protection applies only to the very least developed countries 
and only until 2016. Besides it lacks political feasibility pre-2006 and economical 
feasibility post-2006, so the access scale is low.  Patent waivers should have a 
high access scale impact since they provide a global mechanism.  However, they 
have been graded medium since they are targeted preferentially at improving 
access to treatments for global diseases and would have a neutral effect on access 
to medicines for local diseases (although patent protection for these drugs would 
be a useful complement to ‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms designed to increase 
access to these medicines).  The access scale achievable with price controls could 
be high if applied in both public and private sectors, but it has been ranked as 
medium due to the possibility that products would be withdrawn from the 
market.  
 
Impact on the poor 
 
To what degree does this mechanism have the ability to directly influence prices 
in the poorest countries or the prices paid by the poor within countries?  Is the 
mechanism’s impact on the poor likely to be low, medium or high? 
 
Bulk purchasing is commonly used in the public sector and non-profit health 
sectors, so since the poor utilise these sectors, they would benefit.. However the 
impact would be higher if the mechanism affected private sector prices as well, 
since studies have shown that a large percentage of the poorest people (up to 
80% in some countries) access their drugs through the private sector.  Since price 
controls can be levied at retail pharmacy level, they have therefore been given a 
score of ‘high’.  Given the high prices of drugs relative to per capita income 
available through most voluntary tiered pricing agreements, it is unlikely that the 
poor benefit. 
 
Voluntary licensing, if used, would be destined for countries with manufacturing 
capacity; this presently applies to higher income developing countries (except 
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Bangladesh).  Prior to 2006, compulsory licensing theoretically could be used in 
rich or poor countries, although experience with using it as a negotiating tool has 
so far been limited to those manufacturing countries with higher incomes and 
populations.  After 2006, the economic feasibility of compulsory licensing 
substantially declines, but, if economically possible, it would more likely to be 
politically acceptable (less apt to attract legal retaliation from patent holders) in 
poorer countries.  Patent waivers would affect prices of medicines for global 
diseases like HIV/AIDS but not directly the prices of drugs to treat local 
diseases.  The poor suffer from both global and local diseases.  
 
Predictability 
 
Is the mechanism predictable?  Are the rules of the mechanism easy to predict so 
that a company (for purposes of planning and risk reduction) can determine the 
size of a potential market and its likely competitors?  Do the mechanisms clarify 
what innovator and generic companies can expect during their five and ten year 
business plans? (Note that predictability and ability to plan become more 
important after 2006.) (high, medium or low)  
 
The most highly predictable system would be the patent waiver mechanism, 
since it would be a globally-recognized, well-defined international treaty.  
Delayed patent protection, if effectively implemented, would also rank highly, 
for similar reasons.  Since it would not be clear to generics manufacturers in 
which circumstances the patent holder would wish to supply a price-controlled 
market, price controls may be somewhat more problematic in terms of ensuring 
that generics companies have the information they need to plan and enter 
markets to supply certain products.   
 
Bulk purchasing has been rated as medium, since predictability varies with the 
degree to which the tendering process is professionally managed and open.  
Voluntary licensing would be relatively predictable, since these agreements 
would be made over several years duration.  Voluntary tiered pricing 
agreements and compulsory licensing are the least predictable.  The former are 
negotiated on a country-by-country basis; making predictability low.  
Compulsory licensing is also implemented on a country-by-country, case-by-case 
basis.  This means that, after 2006, a generic patent copier who needs to 
determine whether it is economic to supply a copy of a patented product to one 
or a number of LDCs, upon a compulsory license request, would have difficulty 
in making this calculation. 
 
Sustainability 
Is the mechanism sustainable, or is it dependent on public and NGO pressures, 
the policy/support of a certain board of directors or senior managers in a firm, or 
unsustainable threats (high, medium or low)?  
 
Sustainability would be the highest with patent waivers, followed by bulk 
purchasing.  Sustainability is low with voluntary tiered pricing agreements like 
AAI, with compulsory licensing, and with delayed patent protection; the last two 
are temporary arrangements by definition.  Voluntary licensing has been given a 
sustainability ranking of low until such time as there are more examples to prove 
otherwise.  
 58 
 
Framework for comparative analysis of equitable pricing mechanisms 
Transparency 
 
Is the mechanism transparent, or is it open to manipulation to achieve other, 
hidden, aims (high, medium or low)? 
 
Transparency is lowest with bilateral negotiations, since these are agreements 
between a company and a recipient country which have not, in practice, been 
made public.  Voluntary licensing ranks slightly better only because some 
parameters of the examples cited  have been made public.  Transparency with 
bulk purchasing is high unless corruption enters the picture.  Similarly, 
transparency with compulsory licensing, if feasible, would be relatively high, 
because of all the royalty negotiations, supplier qualification and public attention 
it would receive.  Patent waivers fare the best on the transparency scale, since the 
mechanism would be a globally-accepted, well-publicized declaration signed by 
patent holders.  Delayed patent protection would also be transparent for similar 
reasons.  Price controls levied at domestic level could be open to political 
manipulation.  
 
Political feasibility 
 
How politically feasible is the mechanism (high, medium or low)? 
 
Although not the area of the author’s expertise, it is suggested that political 
feasibility might be high with bulk purchasing, voluntary tiered pricing 
agreements, medium with voluntary licensing and price controls, and low with  
delayed patent protection and patent waivers.  Assurance that leakage of goods 
and of prices can be prevented would be a necessary pre-condition for companies 
to even consider patent waivers.  Political negotiations regarding aspects of 
compulsory licensing have continued beyond 2002, the deadline at which they 
were scheduled to end.  Thus, compulsory licensing has been ranked medium to 
account for the delay in resolution.   
 
Legal feasibility 
 
Is the mechanism legally feasible according to TRIPS (high), or is there some 
uncertainty in the interpretation of TRIPS as applied to this mechanism 
(medium)?  
 
Most of the mechanisms are legally feasible.  There are some unresolved 
questions around the situations in which compulsory licenses can be 
implemented as well as whether products can be manufactured for export to 
countries which have issued compulsory licenses but do not have manufacturing 
capacity. There are also unresolved questions about the anti-competitive nature 
of voluntary tiered pricing agreements which raise entry barriers for generic 
firms.  
 
Transaction costs 
 
Are the transaction costs (i.e. the costs of setting up, negotiating, maintaining, 
revising, managing conflicts) high, medium or low relative to the benefit 
achieved?  
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Transaction costs with voluntary tiered pricing agreements are high, especially 
when considered in light of the limited benefits (price and access) that have been 
achieved.  Transaction costs with compulsory licenses would also be very high 
(although perhaps not high relative to price/access achieved) due to the potential 
for dispute over legalities and royalty rates, the need to find a supplier, etc.  The 
cost of setting up the patent waiver system would be high, but once set up, the 
ongoing transaction costs would be very low.  Voluntary licensing would involve 
medium transaction costs between the patent holder and the licensee.   The 
transaction costs, relative to benefit achieved, for bulk purchasing would vary 
according to the size and professionalism of the organization conducting the 
purchase, but are likely to be relatively low when compared to the other 
mechanisms.  Since the delayed patent protection mechanism would actually 
require reversing patent protection in most LDCs, and would involve 
renegotiating bilateral and regional agreements, this mechanism has been rated 
high in transaction costs.  National price controls would be expensive to set up 
and administer.  
 
Negative competition effects 
 
To what degree might the mechanism have a negative competitive effect, 
particularly on local manufacturing in lesser-developed countries? (low = 
positive or neutral effect on competitive environment, high = mechanism is 
possibly anti-competitive.)  
 
Negative competitive effect would be low with patent waivers and compulsory 
licensing.  Bulk purchasing, if not professionally managed, has the potential to 
have a negative competitive effect.  However, in some countries, bulk purchasing 
has actually had an encouraging effect for domestic producers, helping them 
enter the market when they win tenders for institutional supply, and gain 
sufficient scale to invest in equipment and eventually participate in international 
tenders.   
 
Voluntary licensing also benefits some companies at the expense of others; this is 
not necessarily anti-competitive but can be supportive of a competitive 
environment.  The only mechanism that has an obviously restrictive effect on 
competing companies' ability to enter markets would be voluntary tiered pricing 
agreements.  These agreements, which use a parallel procurement system, are 
also contrary to the aim that each country should have a central purchasing 
system which works on the basis of a transparent public tender.  
 
Retail price impact 
 
To what degree could the mechanism have an effect not just on the ex-
manufacturer price, but on prices right through to the retail/consumer level?   
 
None of the mechanisms discussed in this report has the ability to control prices 
to the consumer except for price controls levied at the retail pharmacy level.  
Theoretically, medicines offered through controlled channels, such as public 
sector facilities, would be able to control the price to patients.  However, many 
studies have shown that this is not reality.  A study recently commissioned by 
WHO and conducted in Uganda for purposes of this report, showed an 
inconsistency between ARV prices offered to Uganda through AAI and the prices 
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paid by patients, indicating that drugs were being marked-up on their journey to 
the patient.86
Interdependence of the mechanisms 
The preceding sections examined the mechanisms based on their independent 
merits.  It is also worth examining how the mechanisms relate to each other, 
recognizing that some mechanisms either facilitate or preclude others.  Some 
mechanisms have been widely employed and for these there are practical 
examples of their interaction with other mechanisms.  In contrast, others have 
only had limited use, and for these we can only imagine their theoretical 
interaction with other mechanisms. 
 
For example, some voluntary mechanisms may inhibit the development of other 
voluntary mechanisms.  If the voluntary license route is employed, the patent 
holder may be unwilling, or even unable, to also offer products manufactured by 
the patent holders’ factories in tiered pricing agreements.  The opposite may also 
be true; companies already offering products through voluntary tiered pricing 
agreements might see little reason to also offer voluntary licenses.  Experience 
with both of these voluntary mechanisms is limited, therefore it can only be 
supposed that these mechanisms might preclude one another. 
 
Another situation where one mechanism would likely impede the use of another 
is in delaying/reversing patent protection and compulsory licensing:  if a country 
does not observe patents, then it would not be able to invoke a compulsory 
license on patented products. 
 
Empirical evidence exists on the interaction between some of the more widely-
used mechanisms.  For example, it would appear that mechanisms that rely on 
market forces and competition serve to enhance or strengthen all of the other 
mechanisms.  e.g. the opportunity to bulk purchase generic ARVs has provided 
the incentive for patent holders to participate in AAI and to lower prices of 
ARVs.  Similarly, the opportunity that TRIPS affords developing countries to 
gain access to therapeutic equivalents through compulsory licensing, has also 
provided incentives to patent holders to engage in voluntary mechanisms as an 
alternative to compulsory licensing.  In this sense, we see how use of the more 
‘compulsory’ mechanisms, which allow for greater competition, has provided a 
framework within which patent holders are persuaded to use their monopoly 
powers more reasonably in the interests of public health in developing countries.
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